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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
On the evening of June 25, 1944, a group of about 60
women gathered in the safety of Guatemala City's San
Francisco church. 1 At 6:00 p.m., the women, dressed in
black to mourn the death of constitutional rule, began
marching silently down Fifth Avenue two by two saying the
rosary and holding candles. A few blocks away a cavalry
unit awaited them with orders from Guatemala's dictator
Jorge Ubico to disperse the gathering by whatever means
necessary. As the procession passed the corner of
Seventeenth Street and Fifth Avenue, both the cavalry and
army units fired a volley of shots into the crowd. When the
firing stopped, Maria Chinchilla, a school teacher from
Guatemala City and a woman later identified as Seriora
Aresti, lay dead in the street. Twenty others were wounded
as the bullets ripped through the crowd. 2
Christine Anne Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico: A Case
of Non-Violent Action in Guatemala" (B.A. Thesis, Friends World
College, 1976) , 89.
2U.S. Department of State, Records of the Department of
State Relating to the Internal Affairs of Guatemala, 1930-1944 ,
814.00/7-2444, FBI report "Guatemala: Possible Revolution", July
24, 1944. All citations for Diplomatic correspondence come from
the Records of the Department of State Relating to the Internal
Affairs of Guatemala. 1930-1944 , and they will be cited
throughout this thesis as DOS with a decimal reference number,
title, date, and page number where applicable.
1
With this event the Guatemalan Revolution began. The
martyrdom of Maria Chinchilla and Aresti galvanized the
opposition overnight behind the demand for Ubico's
resignation. What had been muted requests for the
restoration of constitutional guarantees became a unified
call for an end to his archaic and brutal regime. The U.S.
ambassador, Boaz Long, accurately predicted the political
repercussions of Ubico's action: "I greatly fear this
unfortunate incident may further incite the populace." 3
Within five days massive popular pressure forced Ubico to
resign, and within a year Guatemala had a new constitution,
a popularly elected president, and a reformist Congress.
The collapse of Ubico's regime ushered in a period of reform
which changed Guatemala forever.
The revolutionaries who drove Ubico from power replaced
an outmoded authoritarian dictatorship with a vibrant,
reformist democracy. They exchanged nineteenth century
caudillismo for a more inclusive political system based on
the principles of economic and social justice. With the
reforms they implemented, the dictator's opponents
dismantled the old power structure and introduced modern
economic, political and social institutions which enabled
3DOS 814.00/9-2944, Boaz Long to Hull, June 25, 1944
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them to address their nation's underdevelopment and
renegotiate its dependency.
The Revolution also formed part of a much broader
populist movement which swept all of Latin America from the
193 0s onward. These movements emerged as a response to the
socio-economic crisis brought on by the Great Depression.
They addressed the problems of elite political dominance and
economic under-development which they perceived as the root
of the crisis. The populist movements which coalesced in
this period were predominantly urban, reformist, multi-class
alliances, which drew support from the middle and working
classes and relied on a charismatic leader to hold the
coalition together. 4 It is difficult, however, to
generalize about the nature of the reforms carried out
by populist regimes because of the diversity of approaches
these governments employed to address their social and
economic problems. A list of populist leaders would include
such important figures as Getulio Vargas, Juan Domingo
Peron, Lazaro Cardenas, and Victor Haya de la Torre. The
Guatemalan Presidents Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo and Jacobo
Arbenz Guzman belong in that list as well.
This definition is based on the definition offered by
Michael Conniff in his article "Toward a Comparative Definition
of Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed. , Latin American Populism in
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982).
3
Jorge Ubico's fall marked the end of Guatemala's
Liberal oligarchic era and the establishment of a new
populist order. By exploring the events between the
overthrow of Ubico and the inauguration of Arevalo I will
explain the emergence of the populist political coalition
which ruled Guatemala from 1944 to 1954. This focus
highlights the origins of the dramatic changes which shook
the nation during the following "Ten Years of Spring." The
revolutionaries eventually enacted landmark labor laws, set
up a social security system, encouraged unionization,
carried out land reform, and restructured the economic
system. Those measures changed Guatemala's political and
economic landscape forever. The oligarchy has never
regained absolute power. Since 1944 they have had to share
power with a politicized middle class and an increasingly
independent military.
The Revolution also had it limits, and those limits
tell a great deal about the nature of the political forces
which combined to change the face of Guatemala's political
life. Specifically, the revolutionaries, while instituting
broad and sweeping reforms also reproduced a system based on
class and ethnic division. While they pushed for inclusion
in the political system, the revolutionaries did not
4
aggressively push for a complete reordering of the political
system. This proved an important legacy of the Revolution.
The key to all of these crucial changes lies in the
initial ten months of the Revolution. Many historians have
studied the decade from 1944 to 1954, but none have focused
on this pivotal period from June of 1944 to March of 1945. 5
Between Ubico's fall and Arevalo's induction into office,
the revolutionaries defined the basic tenets of their
movement, enacted numerous structural reforms, and set up a
constitutional system. Examining the nature of this
transitional period emphasizes some important aspects of the
decade of reform known as the "Ten Years of Spring." First,
it places the Guatemalan Revolution in the context of a
broader process of readjustment and reform which took place
in Latin America after the Depression. Second, it expands
our understanding of a key achievement of the Revolution,
the expansion of political participation. Third, it
explicitly focuses on the role of the middle-class and
clarifies the origin of that class and the populist politics
they implemented. And finally, by employing this approach I
hope to expand historians' understanding of populism as a
throughout this thesis I use the phrase the Revolution to
describe the ten year period from 1944 to 1954. When speaking of
the specific uprisings of 1944 I refer to them as the June
Revolution and the October Revolution.
5
whole. By combining a synthesis of the secondary literature
on the Revolution with new insights drawn from newspaper
accounts, Guatemalan Government documents, and U.S.
Department of State sources, I will demonstrate that the
revolutionaries and their vision of a new order were firmly
within the mainstream of Latin American populism.
Placing the Revolution within the framework of populism
helps clarify that Guatemala's political upheaval in the
late 1940s was part and parcel of a much broader process
which effected all of Latin America. Emphasizing this helps
facilitate a comparative analysis of the various populist
experiments in Latin America, and reveals the similarities
and discontinuities in the political history of the nations
of Iberoamerica. Applying the populist label to Guatemala
helps us understand the local process of change and the more
global political trends which it was part of.
This thesis consists of five sections. The first
section discusses the historiography of both the Revolution
and populism. The second explains the context within which
the uprising against Ubico occurred and charts the emergence
of the middle class and the factors which led to the advent
of populism as a political force in the country. The next
section provides an interpretive narrative of the events
from June, 1944 to March, 1945 in an effort to reveal the
6
populist character of the Revolution. This section is the
heart of the thesis, and focuses on the construction of a
new political system by concentrating on the drafting of the
Constitution of 1945. This focus is justified because the
reforms embodied in the constitution provided the foundation
for all reforms that followed. In the final section I offer
some concluding remarks and discuss the legacy of the
Revolution.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LITERATURE
While a comprehensive history of the Guatemalan
Revolution remains to be written, there is an extensive
literature on many different aspects of the revolutionary
process. These works can be broken down into broad
chronological categories for the purpose of summarizing the
historiography of the period. The first category is made up
of contemporary accounts or works that were written during
the "Ten Years of Spring" by observers of the Revolution. 6
The second group is made up of the works which revolution-
aries and their critics wrote immediately after the
overthrow of the Arbenz regime in 1954. These books are
largely the product of the Cold War and they debate the
nature and extent of Communist influence in Guatemala in
this period. 7 The final category consists of the more
The most interesting works in this category are: Kalman
Silvert, A Study in Government : Guatemala (New Orleans, 1954)
;
Carlos Samayoa Chinchilla, El dictador v vo (Guatemala, 1950)
;
Jose Garcia Bauer, Nuestra Revolucion Leaislativa (Guatemala,
1948) ; Samuel Guy Inman, A New day in Guatemala, a Study of the
Present Social Revolution (Wilton, Conn, 1951)
.
7The works in this category are packed with interesting
insights. Some of the best pro-revolutionary works are:
Guillermo Toriello, La batalla de Guatemala (Mexico, 1955) ; Juan
Jose Arevalo, La democracia y el imperio (Santiago, 1954) ; Luis
Cardoza y Aragon, La revolucion auatemalteca (Mexico, 1955) ; and
Manuel Galich, Por que lucha Guatemala, Arevalo v Arbenz: Dos
hombres contra un imperio (Buenos Aires, 1956). On the side of
8
recent academic analyses of the Revolution. Naturally,
these are the most useful and germane for this analysis. 8
A review of the broad range of works on the Guatemalan
Revolution lends support to the argument that this was a
populist movement. Even though very few of the works
explicitly describe it as populist, they all stress the
middle class, reformist nature of the movement. Jim Handy,
Kalman Silvert, Mario Monteforte Toledo, Edelberto Torres-
Rivas, Thomas Leonard, and Kenneth Greib, the most important
contributors to the historiography of the Revolution, agree
on its basically bourgeois-democratic character. According
to this argument the revolutionaries sought to establish
democracy, modernize the economy, expand political
participation, and break the power of the old oligarchy.
The clearest exposition of this interpretation, and the
intellectual inspiration for the analysis presented here,
the critics the most effective works were published in English
and are: James Daniel, Red Design in the Americas: Guatemalan
Prelude (New York, 1954) ; U.S. Department of State, Intervention
of International Communism (Washington, D.C., 1954); and Ronald
Schneider, Communism in Guatemala. 1944-1954 (New York, 1958)
.
The most important works in this category are; Tomas
Herrera, Guatemala: Revolucion de Octubre (San Jose, 1986)
;
Thomas Leonard, The United States and Central America. 1944-1949
(university, Al., 1984); Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History
of Guatemala (Boston, 1984) ; Mario Monteforte Toledo, La
revolucion de Guatemala (Guatemala, 1975) . ; and Richard Immerman,
The CIA in Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of Intervention (Austin,
1982)
.
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can be found in the work of Edelberto Torres-Rivas. 9 He
highlights the "nationalist reformist" nature of the
Revolution and argues that it initiated a decade of
important transformations in Guatemalan society. Torres-
Rivas is correct in noting that the middle class did not
simply reject the authoritarian rule of Jorge Ubico when
they seized power in October of 1944; they also sought to
modernize Guatemala. He interprets the Revolution as the
demise of the old oligarchic system based on the power of
the seignorial elite and its replacement by a new system
that would deliver freedom and prosperity to sectors of
society previously denied such benefits of progress.
Torres-Rivas concludes, and this is the underlying
assumption of the analysis presented here, that these
changes only ushered in a new stage of dependent
development. The middle class forced their way into power.
The elite simply expanded the ruling caste to include the
elements of the middle class which could no longer be
9His primary work is, Interpretacion del desarrollo social
centroamericano (San Jose, 1981), but the clearest and most
concise explanation of his interpretation of the Revolution is in
the essay "Guatemala: Medio siglo de historia politica (Un ensayo
de interpretacion sociologica) " in America Latina: historia de
medio siglo . ed. by Pablo Gonzalez Casanova (Mexico, 1981)
.
Another very provocative work which places the Guatemalan
Revolution in a more global context is Torres-Rivas',
"Centroamerica: algunos rasgos de la sociedad de Postguerra",
Kellogg Institute Working Paper #25 (Notre Dame, IN, 1984).
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ignored. The power of the old oligarchy had been modified,
but not entirely broken. 10
Another key contributor to the literature is Mario
Monteforte Toledo, a Guatemalan sociologist who participated
in the Revolution. In his works, Guatemala. Monoarafia
Socioloqica and La revolucion de Guatemala
,
Monteforte
Toledo analyzes the growth of the middle class and its
political ascendancy. He follows Torres-Rivas very closely
when he writes that the 1920s and 1930s "opened the door to
a new step in political life: the inclusion of both the
salaried and the independent petty bourgeoisie and the
working class, and the initiation of modern capitalism." 11
North Americans such as Jim Handy, Thomas Leonard, and
Richard Immerman document the conflicts of the revolutionary
decade without thoroughly analyzing the nature of the
coalition which dislodged Ubico and uprooted the Liberal
oligarchic order. Like Torres-Rivas and Monteforte Toledo,
however, they employ terminology vaguely resembling populism
but do not specifically define it as populist. For example,
Jim Handy, in his work Gift of the Devil , says that the
"character of the revolution was nationalist and democratic"
10Torres-Rivas, Interpretacion del dessarrollo social
centroamericano , 171-6.
11Mario Monteforte Toledo, Centroamerica , subdessarrollo v
dependencia (Mexico, 1972), vol. 2 , 17.
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with the establishment of a modern capitalist economy as its
primary goal. 12 Richard Immerman closely follows this
interpretation when he writes that the revolutionaries
sought the "organization of a modern capitalist system and
the rearrangement and revitalization of the social
structure." 13 And Thomas Leonard also pursues this same
line of argumentation when he explains that the Revolution
"promised a new order in building Guatemala's resources
without foreign capital and a ' sguare deal 1 for the common
man. "
14
The common thread here is that the authors agree on the
general outlines of the Revolution without seeing it as part
of the broader populist transition which took place through-
out Latin America in the 1930s and 1940s. Only one author,
Roland Ebel (a political scientist)
,
explicitly calls this a
populist political movement. 15 The others are content to
refer to the movement as "more or less populist" or
12Jim Handy, Gift of the Devil: A History of Guatemala
(Boston, 1984) , 103.
13Richard Immerman, The CIA in Guatemala, The Foreign Policy
of Intervention (Austin, 1982 ) , 38.
uThomas Leonard, The United States and Central America,
1944-1949 (University, Al,1984), 84.
15See Roland Ebel, "Populist Opposition to Populism: Middle
Class Opposition to The Arevalo and Arbenz Regimes in Guatemala"
Paper presented at Annual Meeting of the Southwestern Political
Science Association (Spring 1988)
.
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nationalist-democratic. These labels do not adequately
describe the goals or achievements of the Revolution.
They also obscure the fact that the Guatemalan who rose up
against Ubico were very conscious of themselves as part of a
broader Latin American effort to translate the democratic
rhetoric of the war years into concrete political and social
reforms for their nation.
In applying the populist label to Guatemala it is
important to stress that there is no single phenomenon
"populism." Latin American populism is very different from
its counterparts in North America and Russia, and there are
many different types of populism within Latin America. I
will limit my discussion of populism to the Latin American
variants
.
There are a number of historical leaders and movements
which scholars label "populist": Peron in Argentina, Vargas
in Brazil, Cardenas in Mexico, Batlle y Ordonez in Uruguay,
Velasquez in Ecuador, Gaitan in Colombia, and Haya de la
Torre in Peru. All these and many more are understood to be
part of some broader phenomenon called populism. The
Guatemalan Revolution is contemporaneous with most of these
populist movements and it shares many of their attributes
such as; middle class leadership, urban character, a
modernizing reformist vision, demands for political reform,
13
and increased participation. Again, explicitly viewing
Guatemala's experience as part of this broader political
trend helps us understand the dynamics of change which drove
change both locally and throughout the continent.
It is important to note that in the 1930s and 1940s
populism would not have been a term applied by the
participants to their movements. Populism is an abstract
idea which academic observers have applied to political
movements after the fact in order to explain the momentous
changes which swept much of Latin America and the world from
the 1930s to the 1960s. It is a propos here to briefly
explore the historiography of populism and to show how it
has been applied to Latin American political history.
According to Michael Conniff, the first writer to
conceptualize populism rigorously was the Argentine
sociologist Torcuato di Telia. 16 His paper, presented at a
1965 London conference, became the basic frame of reference
in debate about populist movements. 17 He defined populism
as a movement
16Michael Conniff, "Toward a Comparative Definition of
Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed. , Latin American Populism in
Comparative Perspective (Albuquerque, 1982) , 24.
17See Torcuato di Telia, "Populismo y reforma en America
Latina ", Dessarrollo Economico 4 ( 1965) , 391-425 , and "Ideologias
monoliticas en sistemas politicos plurupartidistats: el caso
latinoamericano" , in Argentina, sociedad de masas , ed. Gino
Germani (Buenos Aires, 1965), 272-84.
14
...which enjoys the support of the urban working
class and/or the peasantry but which does not
result from the autonomous organizational power of
either of these two sectors. It is supported by
non-working class sectors upholding an anti-status
quo ideology.
Though a very basic formulation, di Telia's definition hit
upon key elements of populism; mobilization of the masses by
the middle class, discontent with the status quo, and the
transformation of society by a multi-class coalition.
Social scientists (especially in Latin America) debated
and discussed populism throughout the 1960s and 1970s. From
this exchange blossomed a huge volume of scholarship so that
the concept took on a life of its own. The intellectual
interchange between the social sciences and history during
this period led to new ways of thinking about political
history, and in the late 1970s historians appropriated the
idea of populism and integrated it into their work.
Between 1977 and 1983 historians produced several
excellent books about populism. These works contributed
substantially to our understanding of politics in post-War
Latin America revealing continental trends and
18Quoted in Michael Conniff, "Toward a Comparative Definition
of Populism" in Michael Conniff, ed. , Latin American Populism in
Comparative Perspective , (Albuquerque, 1982) , 24.
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commonalities. 19 Unfortunately, the analytical framework of
populism has not yet been vigorously applied to the
experience of Central America as a whole or Guatemala
specifically. 20 Initial attempts have been made to apply
an analysis of populism to Guatemala, but they have been
sketchy at best.
I will show through an interpretive narrative of the
Revolution, that the movement which toppled the last of
Guatemala's Liberal dictator's was not merely liberal
democratic as has been claimed by most historians
,
but
rather was populist in the fullest sense of the word. This
thesis will combine new sources on Guatemala in this period
with the systematic focus on populism applied so fruitfully
to other countries in Latin America. By bringing these two
The key works in the historiography of populism appeared
from 1977 onwards. These works include: Christopher Mitchell, The
Legacy of Populism in Bolivia: From MNR to Military Rule (New
York, 1977) ; Paul Drake, Socialism and Populism in Chile, 1932-
1952 (Urbana, 1978); Rafael Quintero, El mito del populismo en el
Ecuador: Analisis de los fundamentos socio-economicos del
surgimiento del Velasquismo 1 , 1895-1934 (Quito, 1980) ; Michael
Conniff, Urban Politics in Brazil: The Rise of Populism, 1925-
1945 (Pittsburgh, 1981) ; Richard Sharpless, Gaitan of Colombia: A
Political Biography (Pittsburgh, 1978) ; and Steve Stein, Populism
in Peru: The Emergence of the Masses and the Politics of Social
Control (Madison, 1980)
.
20Only Costa Rican populism has been carefully studied in
the work of Charles Ameringer and J.P Bell. See Charles
Ameringer, Don Pepe: A Political Biography of Jose Figueres of
Costa Rica (Albuquerque, 1978) and J.P. Bell, Crisis in Costa
Rica: The 1948 Revolution (Austin, 1971)
.
16
strands together I hope to stimulate some new thinking about
this crucial transition in Guatemala's history, while at the
same time attempting to expand our understanding of
populism as a whole.
17
CHAPTER 3
THE ORIGINS OF POPULIST POLITICS
The growth of the Guatemalan middle class during the
early twentieth century and its subseguent disaffection with
the established order led to the development of a strong
populist movement which ousted the last of the Liberal
dictators in 1944. This movement developed for a number of
reasons. First, the growth of the middle class meant the
growth of a new political force capable of mobilizing
discontent. Second, economic crisis fostered a sense of
urgency among the middle class whereby they were forced to
make a choice between challenging the old oligarchy to
restructure the economy or resigning themselves to sinking
back into poverty. Third, Ubico's repressive rule
heightened middle class resentment of the nation's archaic
political system. Fourth, a surge of nationalism fed by a
growing awareness of the nation's dependency contributed to
the growth of populism, and that sentiment became a key
component of the opposition's ideology. Finally, ideals of
the Atlantic Charter and the political model of Latin
American populism provided powerful inspiration to
18
Guatemalans seeking the language and legitimacy to transform
their nation.
The middle class constituted the most important
component of the political movement which drove Jorge Ubico
from power in 1944. Very little, however, has been written
on the emergence of the middle class as a political force
despite its importance, and even less is known about the
factors which led to its development. In most accounts the
Guatemalan bourgeoisie appears fully formed around 1920, as
if this social class materialized by spontaneous generation
or simply arrived to fulfill its historical mission of
transforming Guatemala into a "modern" democracy.
By 1944, the middle class made up approximately 17
percent of the population of Guatemala. 21 Sixty percent of
this group worked as administrators, teachers, government
workers and military officers. The remaining 4 0 percent
worked for themselves in business, medicine, law. 22 Their
origins, however, remain obscured by inadequte census
materials and a lack of careful historical research.
The crucial question is, however, where did they come
from? Working back from the 1940s when they made up almost
21Mario Monteforte Toledo, Guatemala: Monoarafia sociolocrica
(Mexico, 1959), 257.
22Ibid.
19
20 percent of the population, it is difficult to trace the
development of the middle class empirically. The nucleus of
this class, however, almost certainly formed during the
economic boom periods of the late nineteenth century. It
most likely expanded as the agricultural export sector
stimulated demand for goods and services. In short, the
economic success of indigo, cochineal and coffee in the late
nineteenth century probably spurred the development of an
independent, national bourgeoisie. 23 The appearance of this
group can intuitively be linked directly to the processes of
economic growth, expansion of the State apparatus, and
urbanization in this period.
The expansion of the coffee economy during the booms of
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries created
new opportunities for the nascent middle class. The nation
experienced a hundredfold increase in coffee production
between the 1870s and the early 1900s, and the economy grew
rapidly. 24 The progress of these years benefitted the
coffee oligarchy almost exclusively. But the boom seems to
have lead to the emergence of the middle class because the
23Ibid. , 250-257. See also Piero Gleijeses, "La aldea de
Ubico: Guatemala, 1931-1944" in Mesoamerica 17 (June 1989) : 25-
59.
24Chester Lloyd Jones, Guatemala, Past and Present (New
York, 1966), 210.'
20
elite needed doctors, lawyers, administrators, and
government officials to keep the system running smoothly.
Urban growth, fueled by the role of the cities as
commercial and distribution centers, also probably furthered
the middle class' expansion, with an increasing population
of city dwellers came the attendant demands for skilled
workers and services. Native Americans who migrated to the
capital to fill the needs of the expanding agro-export
economy formed the bulk of the expanding middle class. in
giving up their traditional dress, language and culture the
traditional Native Americans became ladinos (or hispanicized
Indians) and made a huge transition from the world of their
ancestors to the world of the urban metropolis.
Guatemala City's emergence as the administrative and
distribution center for export agriculture also spurred the
expansion of the middle class. The population of Guatemala
City and environs in 1893 stood at approximately 100,000,
and this number grew to around 200,000 by 1921. 25 Fully
270,000 people lived in the city by 1940. 26 Quetzaltenango,
"Ibid., 268.
26This number is based on the 1950 census population for
Guatemala City which was 283,000. For 1950 numbers see
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The
Economic Development of Guatemala (Washington, 1951)
.
21
Guatemala's second largest city mirrored the growth of the
capital
.
27
The expansion of the state apparatus throughout the
Liberal era proved a crucial impetus for stimulating the
development of the national bourgeoisie. The rising number
of government positions provided jobs for an increasing
number of urban salaried workers as teachers, technocrats,
and civil servants. This expansion of the state bureaucracy
intensified during the pre-Depression coffee export boom,
and many people moved into the solid middle class in this
period by landing a government job and gaining the economic
security which allowed to become "respectable" members of
society.
Urban growth, economic booms, and the expansion of the
state provided the necessary conditions for the development
of the middle class but these phenomenon do not explain the
emergence of populism. It took the economic crisis of 1929,
the restriction of personal liberties under Ubico, growing
nationalism, and international political trends to forge the
populist coalition which defeated Ubico.
For more information of demographic trends see Carol A.
Smith, "El dessarrollo de la primacia urbana, la dependencia en
la exportacion y la formacion de clases en Guatemala",
Mesoamerica 8 (1984): 195-278. See also Gilda Segrada Sagot y
Jorge Arriaga, "El processo historico en la formacion urbana
Guatemalteca, 1773-1944", Anuario de Centroamerica 7 (1981): 43-
70.
22
Until the 1940s the middle class had never acted
independently because strong bonds linked them to the
landholding oligarchy. Ties of patronage and dependence
undermined the ability of the clase media to form themselves
into an interest group separate from the oligarchy. The
fact that they did eventually break these ties and formed a
separate class with distinct interests can be linked
directly to their vulnerable position in the economy.
Economic crises, brought on by fluctuations in world coffee
markets, continually exposed them to forces beyond their
control. The Depression fostered growing discontent after
the nation's coffee economy collapsed in 1929 when
international price of coffee collapsed.
The impact of the Depression on Guatemala is
intriguing. Although the downturn devastated the coffee
economy, it actually stimulated domestic production of
foodstuffs because imports became comparatively expensive.
This had the effect of actually stimulating the national
economy from about 1934 onwards (see the graph below) . Thus
the worst effects of the Depression had passed as early as
1933. The pressure on the middle class resulted from their
links to government because state expenditures also
plummeted as taxes from the coffee trade dried up. Since
import and export duties supplied the government with around
23
90% of its revenues, the coffee slump spelled trouble for
government employees. in the worst years of the Depression,
Ubico "deferred" civil servant's salaries.
The middle class felt the greatest economic pressure,
however, when World War II began. The wartime disruption of
trade with Europe and the United States sent Guatemala's
dependent economy into another tailspin. Production, which
had expanded in the years following the collapse of 1929,
plummeted, and the ensuing economic contraction set off a
vicious bout of inflation which undermined the middle class'
tenuous economic security. The chart below graphically
captures the extent of the crisis brought on by World War
II. 28
This chart shows the enigmatic reaction of Guatemala 1 s
economy to the Depression . After a brief downturn between 1929
and 1933, the economy experienced very substantial growth. This
growth occurred mostly because of the expansion of production for
domestic consumption . This economic enigma has yet to be
explained satisfactorily by economic historians, but it provides
interesting questions for further research
.
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The economic problems brought on by World War II
convinced the middle class that they needed political power
to save themselves from falling back into the ranks of the
lower class. The very economic forces which formed it, led
the clase media to demand political power. The economic
booms and busts also persuaded the bourgeoisie that they had
to "modernize" Guatemala's economy. For generations they
experienced, on a very personal level, the devastating price
of dependency. When coffee prices fell or droughts hit,
Based on Victor Bulmer Thomas, The Political Economy of
Central America since 1920 (Cambridge, 1987), Table A3, 312. The
statistics are adjusted to take inflation into account.
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their government jobs disappeared, their law practices
atrophied, their teaching jobs were cut. 30
Ubico -s restriction of political freedoms exacerbated
tensions caused by the economic crisis. His repressive
policies contributed to middle class mobilization behind
populist demands. Just as the economy had expanded in the
1920s, so too had political freedoms. The fall of the
dictator Estrada Cabrera in 1920 initiated a brief period of
increased political freedom. 31 This era of liberty ended,
however, when Jorge Ubico seized power in 1931. Although he
came to power promising reforms, as his term progressed it
became clearer and clearer that he would tolerate no dissent
and that he could not or would not deliver the promised
reforms. He tightened his grip throughout the 1930s and
increased harassment of the few opponents who dared to
challenge him openly. By 1944 Ubico had complete control of
This scaling back of government expenditures during
Ubico* s reign testify to the middle class tenuous position.
Although the economy had recovered by 1933, government
expenditures remained well below 1928 levels for more than a
decade. Ubico' s fiscal restraint translated into lost jobs for
many teachers and civil servants. For more on this see Kenneth
Greib's Guatemalan Caudillo, the Regime Of Jorge Ubico, Guatemala
1931-1944 (athens, Ohio, 1979), 54.
31John Holger Petersen, "The Political Role of University
Students in Guatemala, 1944-1968" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University
of Pittsburgh, 1969), 56.
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the country, and the repression of his reign is still
infamous in Guatemala today.
Ubico's spying, censorship, and harassment of opponents
bothered the middle class which felt that such repression
proved the backwardness of their country. During the
political opening of the 1920s, many members of the clase
media nad become accustomed to freedom of expression and
other civil rights. So Ubico's iron-fisted policies drove
many to oppose him and the old ways of governing that he
represented. By repressing his opponents, the dictator only
fed the middle class' resentment.
A good example of middle class discontent arising out
of Ubico's repression occurred at the University of San
Carlos. During the 1920s, the predominantly middle class
university students initiated a movement to press for
institutional autonomy, student input into administrative
matters, and curricula revisions. This effort reflected a
similar drive throughout Latin America known as the
University Reform Movement, which began at the Argentine
University of Cordoba in 1918. The students had largely
achieved their goals of autonomy and student co-government
of San Carlos when Ubico seized power and reversed their
gains. 32 He soon placed the university under the direct
32Ibid., 57.
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control of the Ministry of Education and the students lost
their input in administrative matters. This reversal bred
resentment against Ubico in a vital sector of the middle
class. The students' alienation assured that Ubico would
have an articulate and influential opposition to contend
with in the coming years.
Growing nationalism and anti-imperialist sentiment also
fostered the growth of populism. National pride surfaced as
a direct result of Guatemalans' increasing awareness of
their country's underdevelopment and dependence. 33 An
anonymous U.S. government observer in 1944 summarized the
elements which fed these feelings when he stated,
The current factors of insecurity are related to a
more general background of insecurities: a
primitive, impoverished Indian population ruled by
an absolute dictator, a national economy largely
dependent on two export crops, coffee and bananas,
and a general agricultural backwardness which
Dependency here is used as a descriptive term which refers
to concrete structural conditions which govern the economic life
of a country. It is a situation in which a country's development
is tied to the export of a single crop for export to an extremely
limited market. Economic growth within a dependent country is
determined by external factors and not by domestic conditions.
There are many other definitions of dependency, but this simple
definition highlights the structural relationship of under-
developed nations to their markets, and the overall impact on the
economy. In the case of Guatemala, a strong dependency developed
over time on the U.S. both as a market for Guatemala's goods and
as a source of manufactured goods.
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leaves four-fifths
uncultivated. 34
of the land totally
The agrarian oligarchy became the symbol of Guatemala's
backwardness for the growing opposition and fueled middle
class resentment. Their large estates, called fincas
.
dominated the economy, producing coffee and bananas for
export and contributing over 95 percent of the total value
of Guatemala's exports. Coffee alone, however, provided
nearly three quarters of the country's export earnings,
making it the linchpin of the entire economic order. The
coffee oligarchy's complete control of the economy convinced
a growing number of Guatemalans that thorough structural
reforms were the only antidote to the nation's
underdevelopment.
The banana industry, however, provided a base of
operation for the single most important symbol of the
nation's economic problems, the United Fruit Company. This
company's activities, more than any other, fueled Guatemalan
nationalism by providing a very concrete example of the
nation's economic backwardness. UFCO, a Boston-based
multinational corporation, had a de facto stranglehold over
34U.S. State Department, "Current Factors of Insecurity in
Guatemala" O.S.S. /State Department Special Report, November
12,1944, from O.S.S. /State Department Intelligence and Research
Reports; Latin America, 1941-1960 (Washington, 1975)
.
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the economy which stemmed from its control (through
subsidiaries and affiliated companies) of the nation's
ports, railroads, shipping lines and electric company.
Because of its dominant position in the economy, "La
Frutera" ,as UFCO was called, could punish those who opposed
it through freight rate manipulation or by denying them an
outlet for their produce. Though they only commanded a
small fraction of the economy, UFCO and its subsidiaries
controlled Guatemala's economic development by directing the
flow of commerce. The power wielded by the company
distorted the nation's development by conditioning economic
growth on corporate decisions made in a Boston board room,
rather than on priorities set within the country.
Increasing reliance on the U.S. between 1931 and 1944
for both imports and trade outlets fuelled nationalism. The
percentage of Guatemalan products consumed by North
Americans grew steadily under Ubico and as a result
dependence on U.S. markets deepened. In 1936 Guatemala sent
just under 60 percent of its exports to the northern
colossus. The disruption of links with Europe during World
War II broke the old trade patterns, and by 1941, Guatemala
relied on its northern neighbor to buy almost 80 percent of
30
its exports. 35 Guatemala also depended more and more on the
gringos as a source for imports. The strengthening of
dependent relations forced the Guatemalan middle class to
question the benefits of such reliance on the greedy and
expansionist yankees.
In the face of growing discontent, the Guatemalan
bourgeoisie sought ways to articulate and legitimize its
demands for structural reform and political liberalization.
The global struggle between fascism and democracy provided
the ideal rhetorical underpinnings for their challenge to
oligarchic control. Roosevelt's progressive policies in the
U.S. and the issuing of the Atlantic Charter clearly showed
that democracy and economic opportunity were global
concerns. The Guatemalan middle class clearly felt
themselves part of a broader struggle against oppression.
The middle class also looked to Latin America's
populist regimes when they sought a model for change. The
reforms of Mexican President Lazaro Cardenas constituted an
important frame of reference. Other leaders offered
promising examples as well; Argentina's Peron, Peru's Haya
de la Torre, and Brazil's Vargas each presented variations
John Adler, Eugene Schlesinger, and Ernest Olson, Public
Finance and Economic Development in Guatemala (Stanford, 1952)
,
38. See also Kenneth Greib, Guatemalan Caudillo. the Regime of
Jorge Ubico. Guatemala 1931-1944 (Athens, Ohio, 1979), 147.
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on the populist theme. These leaders articulated programs
which promised democracy and economic development. They
showed that a distinctly Latin American political form did
exist that could transform the continent.
Many Guatemalan politicians spent years exiled in Peru,
Mexico, Chile, and Argentina, and they drew inspiration from
the changes they witnessed there. Although no single
populist formula existed, Latin American nations
experimented with a variety of political forms which
combined economic restructuring with the expansion of
political participation. Exiled Guatemalans saw these
reforms enacted in their host countries and decided that
such models could address their own society's under-
development and dependency.
In 1944, the middle class seized power from the old
oligarchy. The act of taking power and seeking solutions to
the problems facing Guatemala temporarily welded together
the opposition. Surging nationalism, demands for political
liberalization, and the general crisis of the old oligarchic
economic system combined to spur the development of populism
in Guatemala. The middle class wanted power to control
their own destinies and to develop the nation. Without the
economic problems of the period and the repressive nature of
32
Ubico's regime, however, it is probable that Guatemala would
never have experienced the populist challenge of 1944.
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CHAPTER 4
THE REVOLUTION
(May 1944 - March 1945)
The Revolution passed through five distinct phases
between the overthrow of Ubico and the inauguration of Juan
Jose Arevalo Bermejo, and each one of these phases
illustrates a specific aspect of the populist nature of
Guatemala's Revolution. The first phase lasted from the
first tremors of social unrest in early May 1944 to Ubico'
s
overthrow in July. The formation of an urban, multiclass
political movement with middle class leadership defined this
early period. The second phase lasted from General Ponce's
appointment as president by Ubico in July until the return
of Arevalo from Argentine exile in September. The formation
of a number of political parties and labor unions
characterized this phase. The expansive nature of the
Revolution became clear in these months.
The broad and populist character of the Revolution did
not take definitive shape until the third phase. Arevalo 's
return from exile marked the beginning of this phase which
lasted until the armed revolt of October 20th, 1944. His
charismatic leadership bound the coalition together in an
open challenge to Ponce's plans to remain in power. The
period from late October 1944 to February 1945 constitutes
34
the vital fourth phase of the Revolution because of the
important reform carried out by the Junta which took over
after Ponce's ouster.
The final phase lasted from February to March of 1945
as the revolutionaries drafted and debated a new
constitution. They defined much of the nature of post-Ubico
Guatemala through the constitutional changes they imposed.
The expansion of political participation through the
extension of suffrage characterized this period.
The promulgation of the Constitution of 1945 on March
13 and Arevalo's inauguration two days later signalled the
triumph of the Revolution. The revolutionaries had
succeeded in constructing the basis for a new socio-
political order in Guatemala. From this point onwards the
challenge became translating the vague promises of economic
transformation and expanded political participation into
reality.
A. The June Revolution
(May - June 1944)
In May of 1944, full-fledged public opposition to Ubico
emerged for the first time. The caudillo '
s
opponents had
planned and plotted secretly, but in early 1944 they began
openly challenging the aging tyrant. During this period a
broad-based coalition emerged which drew on all social
35
classes for it support. The middle class, however, provided
decisive leadership, much as it had in other populist
movements. The aspect of populism which emerged most
clearly before June, 1944 therefore, was the urban, middle
class leadership of a broad multi-class movement.
The overthrow of Maximilliano Hernandez Martinez, the
dictator of neighboring El Salvador, in April by a student-
led non-violent movement proved to be the event which set
the Guatemalan opposition in motion. 36 The success of a
non-violent movement in El Salvador led them to believe that
they too could oppose dictatorship with passive resistance.
The development of a peaceful strategy for opposing Ubico
drew on similar plans employed against dictators in Bolivia,
Ecuador, Costa Rica, Honduras, and El Salvador. Non-
violence provided Ubico' s opponents with the practical means
for ridding themselves of tyranny. 37
For an interesting and careful historical study of the
overthrow of Hernandez Martinez see Patricia Parkman's Nonviolent
Insurrection in El Salvador; The fall of Maximilliano Hernandez
Martinez (Tucson, 1988) . This book is the most recent
contribution to the literature on the topic, and it gives
insights into the awareness of non-violence among the opposition
in El Salvador and their use of passive resistance to bring down
the dictator.
37The idea of passive resistance was the basis of the early
strategy against Ubico, and numerous State Department documents
detail plans for non-violent resistance to the regime by the
opposition. For an example of this see DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI
Report, June 22 1944, 12-23. See also Clamp, "The Overthrow of
Jorge Ubico".
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The overbearing presence of Ubico, with his arbitrary,
personalistic rule, seemed archaic to the opposition. They
desperately wanted to free Guatemala from caudillismo and
bring it into the world of the Four Freedoms and the
Atlantic Charter. The people of other Latin American
nations had successfully rejected dictatorship and the
Guatemalans wanted to do the same. Opposition sprang up
throughout the country, but Guatemala City became the
epicenter of the revolt against Ubiquismo . All of the major
confrontations in this phase, and throughout the entire
Revolution, took place in the capital. 38 The revolt, in
essence, was an urban affair.
A group of forty-five prominent lawyers set off a chain
reaction of open defiance to Ubico in May of 1944 when they
requested the removal of a number of judges who held
jurisdiction over the trials of the dictator's opponents. 39
In the hope of diffusing the situation, Ubico acquiesced and
removed the judges. Within weeks teachers pressed the
regime for wage and benefit increases.
The narrative of events in this section is drawn from
several sources the most important of which are DOS 814.00/7-
2444, FBI Report, June 22, 1944 and Christine Clamp "The Overthrow
of Jorge Ubico".
39 Silvert, Guatemala , 6.
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The lawyers' success provided inspiration for students
at the University who in turn provided leadership for the
movement as a whole/0 The University Students Association
(Asociacion de Estudiantes Universitar i
a
r
or AEU)
, founded
in 1943, played a pivotal role/ 1 m addition to represent-
ing the university students, the AEU congress held the
allegiance of a broad grouping of professionals and alumni.
They spoke for hospital interns, court clerks, and teachers
at primary and secondary schools because of these groups
ties to the university. in the legal profession a strong
link existed between the university and former law students
because many junior partners in law firms continued taking
classes as they worked. 42 Students also filled the lower
levels of the civil service. Because of their involvement
in the professional community, the government, and the
university the students were in a unigue position to
mobilize middle class discontent behind populist demands.
The students began slowly pressuring the dictator on
June 3, by requesting the removal of Dr. Ramiro Galvez, the
For an excellent account by a participant which captures
the role of the University students see Manuel Galich's Del
panico al ataque , (Guatemala, 1977)
.
41 Galich, Del panico al ataque , 225-230.
42Silvert, Guatemala . 6. See also Galich, Del panico al
ataque , 243-275.
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dean of the Medical School and Dr. Oscar Espada, secretary
of the Medical faculty. The students despised the two men
because Ubico had appointed them to control the rebellious
university. Galvez and Espada personified dictatorial rule
within the university community. 43 To the surprise of
everyone, particularly the universitarios
,
Ubico agreed to
their removal and replaced them with individuals more
acceptable to the students. This concession, another
attempt to diffuse tension, opened the way for more student
demands. 44
The students moved quickly to capitalize on their first
success, and momentum began to gather. On June 7, students
in the School of Pharmacy circulated petitions requesting
the removal of their dean, Licenciado Soto, as well as
demanding curricula reforms. They subsequently submitted
the petitions to Ubico 's Minister of Public Education, and
the dean resigned. 45 Students in the School of Economic
Science made a similar move when they demanded the
resignation of the Secretary of their faculty, Licenciado
DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, July 22, 1944, 1.
Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 71.
DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944, 2.
Jimenez Pinto. Pinto also offered his resignation
immediately. 46
All of Ubico's appointed officials at the University
appeared to be doomed. On June 18, the Law students
followed the lead of students in other Schools by requesting
that Ubico remove Victor Mijanos, the newly appointed Dean
of their faculty, who they claimed was unfit for the post
because of his addiction to alcohol. They also demanded the
removal of Carlos Giron Zirion, the Secretary of the Faculty
whose close ties to Ubico made him undesirable. The
students offered a list of prominent attorneys who would be
acceptable and left the choice up to Ubico. 47
The law students raised the stakes on June 19 when they
informed Ubico that they would boycott classes if he did not
accede to their demands. The dictator informed a delegation
of students that he would honor their request only if they
would immediately resume attendance of classes. The fact
that he met all of the demands reflected the student's
influential position in the society as a whole. Peasants
and worker were often shot or imprisoned simply for making
demands, and their petitions were rarely met by the
caudillo. The students, however, were the future doctors,
46Ibid.
47Ibid.
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lawyers, teachers and civil servants which society relied on
for vital services. They were also the sons and daughters
of Guatemala's respectable middle class.
Ubico thought that he could neutralize the students'
complaints by making some simple personnel changes. This
miscalculation backfired when instead of being pacified, the
universitarios got bolder and bolder. As they pressed their
demands it became clear that Ubico could not satiate them
without appearing weak.
The struggle escalated on June 21 when the AEU drafted
a new set of demands. They insisted that Ubico release
several imprisoned universitarios who had been held for six
months without charges for their involvement in the
University Students Association. 48 The group threatened to
shut down the university and walk off their jobs as primary
and secondary teachers within 24 hours if Ubico did not
release their colleagues and institute reforms at the
University.
The students called for university autonomy, a purge of
political appointees at the school, increased input into
university affairs and job security for professors.
Interestingly, they included in the petition a request for
an immediate wage increase for all members of the University
DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944, 5
Students Association who taught at the primary or secondary
level. Their demands reflected a clear self-interest. They
did not demand any changes in the government; they
articulated specific grievances of the university community.
The students organized effectively to achieve their goals,
but they had not yet come out in full rebellion against
caudillismo .
Ubico recognized that the scope of the universitarios
demands expanded each time he conceded. He understood that
he had to stop them while they continued to address their
own parochial concerns, while they remained isolated.
Stopping the students, in the end, proved very difficult.
Ubico' s decision to suspend constitutional guarantees
on June 22, changed the nature of the protests/9 His
decree stated that such extreme measures were made necessary
by
Nazi-fascist tendencies trying to obstruct
maintenance of order so necessary at the present
time because of the extraordinary circumstances
created by the struggle which exists in the world
in defense of democratic institutions and the
freedom of nations. 50
El Imparcial . June 22, 1944.
814.00/7-2444, FBI report July 22, 1944, 6.
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Ubico masked the suspension in anti-fascist rhetoric, but
the point was clear; the students had gone too far. All
national papers carried the decree, and throughout Guatemala
City officials read it aloud with the accompaniment of
martial music.
This decree was Ubico «s greatest blunder. Even his
closest advisers recognized the politically explosive nature
of the student's demands. The professional community, and
the middle class generally, supported the students and urged
them on. The AEU responded quickly and effectively to
Ubico 1 s state of siege. Within hours, twelve public schools
and all of the "national" schools called strikes. Soon the
hospital interns, court employees, and university students
walked away from their jobs. By June 24, every lawyer in
Guatemala City had closed down their offices. Doctors
refused to work at the hospital, although clinics remained
open.
This upheaval began to take its toll on Ubico and his
associates. On June 23, the dictator convened the first
cabinet meeting of his term. Prior to the strike, he had
dealt with all major decisions himself. Because of the
magnitude of the crisis, he now felt he needed to discuss
the situation with his lackeys. Various ministers
51 Ibid., 12
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immediately tendered their resignations, but Ubico refused
to accept them. His secretary, Dr. Guillermo Cruz, made the
point that they could show no weakness in the face of such
volatile conditions, because any resignations might lead to
demands for the resignation of Ubico himself. 52 Cruz spoke
these prophetic words even as the opposition grew stronger
and more unified every day. The cabinet adjourned, resolved
to hang on until the bitter end.
The next day, June 24, 1944, two lawyers, Jorge Serrano
and Frederico Carbonell, presented Ubico with a petition,
known as the Memorial de los 311 . demanding the restoration
of constitutional guarantees. The Memorial stated,
Guatemala cannot remove itself from the democratic
imperatives of the era. It is impossible to
frustrate with coercive means the uncontainable
impulses of that generous ideology which is being
reaffirmed in the world's conscience by means of
the bloodiest struggle between oppression and
liberty. 53
The petition was a powerful testament to the broad multi-
class nature of the Revolution. The list of signatories
read like a Who's Who of Guatemala society. Members of the
old elite, lawyers, industrialists, doctors, and even
52Ibid., 14.
53Roland Schneider, Communism in Guatemala, 1944-1954 (New
York, 1959), 11.
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Ubico
-s close friends signed. After the submission of this
petition no one could doubt the breadth of the movement
against Ubico.
The students' demands for reform at the University
faded into the background as the opposition moved to define
a broader agenda. The AEU, however, continued to provide
leadership to the expanding movement. They organized two
demonstrations on June 24. The first manifestation took
place at noon with about 500 students and a large crowd of
supporters. The group gathered in the central plaza in
front of the National Palace and marched through the city.
The police and the army did not molest the demonstrators and
the crowd dispersed without incident. 54
At 6:00 p.m. that same day, the students mobilized for
a second, larger demonstration with over 800 students and
numerous supporters. The group formed a procession through
the business district. They then systematically began to
disrupt theatres, nightclubs, and restaurants, entering and
forcing the patrons to leave. These actions effectively
closed down the city ceter. Again the police and army did
not harass the marchers. 55
DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944, 14.
Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 81.
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That evening, however, Ubico resorted to the tactics he
knew best to intimidate his opposition. He gave a group of
police agents free reign in the city and as much alcohol as
they could drink. The mob attacked the suburb of Colonia
Ubico and disrupted a fair, destroyed a beer parlor, dance
halls, and much other property. Looting and robbing, the
mob proceeded into the central district of the capital.
Another mob caused similar damage in the Avenida Bolivar
district. Ubico used these "riots" by his own agents as a
pretext for continuing the state of emergency. 56
The next day, June 25, another group of lawyers went
directly to Ubico and demanded a repeal of the decree
suspending civil liberties. They backed up their demand
with the threat that the doctors and pharmacists would join
the strike the following day. Ubico politely heard the
jurists out and then dismissed them, making only vague
promises and stressing the unsettled conditions which forced
him to take such "regrettable" actions. 57
By 11:00 A.M. the opposition gathered again in the
central plaza and once again marched through the business
district. Ubico, however, decided to up the ante. Police,
56Silvert, Guatemala , 6, and DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report,
June 22 1944, 16-19.
57DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, June 22 1944, 20.
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army and cavalry units dispersed the crowds using corrosive
chemical bombs and truncheons. 58 Several people received
serious burns from the chemicals and shrapnel wounds from
the bombs
.
In response to the violence of the morning demonstra-
tion, the opposition decided that only women should march
that evening, presuming that Ubico would not fire on them. 59
As described in the introduction, a group of about 60 women
gathered and marched through the city dressed in black and
reciting the rosary. 60 Ubico, however, could not allow such
an open challenge to his authority and he ordered troops to
fire on the procession. Two women died in the street and
stray bullets wounded 80 others. 61 The movement now had
martyrs, and the demands changed from humble reguests for
their rights to forceful calls for Ubico 's resignation and a
thorough transformation of Guatemalan society. 62
The strike spread further, and people waited for
Ubico' s response. An outraged populace flooded the National
58Ibid.
59Christine Anne Clamp "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 89.
60Silvert, Guatemala , 6, and DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report,
June 22 1944, 20.
61 D0S 814.00/9-2944, Boaz Long to Hull, June 25, 1944.
62DOS 814.00/7-2444, FBI Report, July 24, 1944.
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Palace with petitions, but the demonstrations ceased as the
entire nation waited to see how Ubico would respond.
In the ensuing days, however, the opposition began
pressuring Ubico 's associates to convince him to resign or
to resign in protest themselves. Ernesto Viteri y Bertrand
and his law partner Eugenio Silva y Pena convinced Ubico -s
chief of police, Colonel David Ordonez to talk to the aging
dictator. Ubico fired Ordonez on the spot for suggesting
that he resign. 63 The opposition also convinced the
Minister of Finance, Jose Gonzales to resign. 64
On June 29, 1944, Ubico resigned himself. The 66 year
old caudillo had decided in April that if events got out of
control he would rather leave peacefully than "with blood on
his hands." 65 Feeling betrayed by the number of his close
friends who had signed the Memorial five days earlier and
wanting to avoid further bloodshed, Ubico retired to his
coffee f inca near the town of Antigua. 66
Ubico chose General Frederico Ponce Vaides to form a
military triumvirate with Generals Eduardo Villagran Ariza
and Buenaventura Pineda. The selection process reveals how
63Clamp, "The Overthrow of Jorge Ubico", 97.
"ibid.
65DOS 814.00/7-144, Long to State, July 1, 1944
^Grieb, Guatemalan Caudillo , 274.
48
little it mattered who specifically replaced the dictator.
Throughout his regime, the generals who did not hold regular
commands gathered daily at the National Palace to serve as
errand boys and troubleshooters for the dictator. The day
Ubico decided to resign, there were only three retired
generals in his outer office due to the early hour. He
appointed them to be the members of the troika which would
run the country because they happened to be present at the
right time, not because they were close associates or
particularly competent. 67 These three generals formed the
public face of the transitional government which was, in the
end, a government of all of Ubico' s generals. They
represented Ubiauismo without Ubico.
The resignation of Ubico had come about because of the
rapid formation of a broad-based, urban movement which
mobilized to demand political change. The students had been
forced by events to move beyond their parochial demands and
lead a multi-class political movement against the
dictatorship and in favor of reform. During the next phases
of this populist revolution, the middle class leadership
faced the challenge of transforming opposition to Ubico into
67Kenneth Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution
of 1944" The Americas , 32:4 (April 1976), 532.
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a coherent political movement for structural changes in
Guatemala's socio-economic system.
B.The Pones Interregnum
(July - September 1944)
The appointment of Ubico's triumvirate marked the
beginning of the next phase of the Revolution, the battle
over the fate of Post-Ubico Guatemala. Two processes
characterized this phase. First, activists founded the
political parties and labor unions which provided the base
of support for the populist coalition which would rule the
country for the following decade. And the second was the
long struggle between the triumvirate and the opposition for
power. During this time the middle class leadership of the
movement had to articulate its vision of a new Guatemala and
the vague outlines of the populist reforms they proposed
took shape. In short, this period witnessed the expansion of
political activity and the emergence of a unified populist
opposition with a nebulous political agenda. The
unification took place as the many political parties formed
a broad electoral front behind the candidacy of Juan Jose
Arevalo to oust Ponce and the triumvirate from power.
Political programs, however, were the furthest thing
from the mind of Guatemalans as news of Ubico's resignation
swept through the city. Thousands flooded into the streets
to celebrate. They had brought down the tyrant. The
triumvirate removed all troops from the city and let the
people celebrate. Only later would it become clear that
Ponce intended to maintain Ubico's system more or less
intact with a new dictator at the helm.
In the tumultuous days following Ubico's departure, the
citizens of the city tested the limits of their new freedom.
When the National Assembly convened on the 4th of July,
crowds packed the galleries, determined to make their voices
heard. The crowd's disruptive enthusiasm forced the old
Ubiquista Assembly to adjourn after accepting Ubico's
resignation. The police and army moved in and cleared the
Assembly hall. 69 In a closed session, the lawmakers, shaken
by the anarchy in their chamber, appointed Ponce the
Provisional President of Guatemala, with police and troops
protecting them from "the forces of disorder."
The period from Ponce's appointment in early July to
the return of Arevalo in early September provided the
opposition with the opportunity to forge coalitions and
political parties. Ponce had announced that election would
be held in November to elect a new president. The
opposition began preparations immediately.
El Imoarcial . July 4, 1944.
DOS 814.00/7-444, FBI Report, July 4, 1944, 7.
The National Renovation Party (Partidp_Renoyaclpn
Nacipnal, referred to throughout as the RN) became the first
opposition party when it formed on the same day that Ubico
resigned. It played a major role in the months to come and
throughout the Revolution. Because intellectuals and
professionals made up the bulk of its members, however, the
RN remained a relatively small party. The Popular
Liberating Front ( Frente Popular Libertadnra
r
or FPL) , the
other major revolutionary party, also formally organized
itself during this phase. Students and young professionals
who had links to the University formed the majority of the
FPL's membership. The RN and FPL soon began unifying behind
the candidacy of Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo Bermejo, an
unassuming pedagogue who became the focus of hopes for a new
Guatemala. Arevalo rapidly emerged as the opposition's
candidate of choice because of his strong appeal with the
University students, who were the heart and soul of the
movement
.
Arevalo' s background helped him garner support among a
population that knew very little about him. Born in 1904 in
Santa Rosa province, the future president was of rural
middle class origin. His father owned and worked a small
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farm and his mother taught in a local school. 70 Because of
his mother's connections he gained entry to the renowned
Pamplona Normal School from the age of six and from then on
received instruction at the nation's best schools in
Guatemala City, in 1927, Arevalo received Guatemala's most
prestigious scholarship for study abroad, and spent the next
seven years in Argentina pursuing a doctorate in education,
which he completed in 1934.
In 1934, he returned to Guatemala and quickly entered
the civil service. Ubico appointed him Subsecretary for
Public Education, a post he held for two years before
becoming disillusioned with the caudillo's repressive rule.
Arevalo felt sure the dictator would not allow him an
opportunity to try his ideas for educational reform, so he
chose voluntary exile rather than the constant frustration
of remaining in Guatemala. He decided to return to Argentina
where he worked as a Professor of Education at the
University of Tucuman. He remained there until the fall of
The following section on Arevalo 's background is based on
an extensive commentary by the U.S. Ambassador to Argentina. This
document was not given a number in the DOS microfilm series, but
it is referred to as "Despatch no. 17049, dated January 19th,
1945 from American Embassy, Buenos Aires entitled Antecedents of
Juan Jose Arevalo, President elect of Guatemala'". Additional
information is drawn from DOS 814.00/10-3044, "Confidential
Report #1355-55, Major Victor Rose, Assistant Military Attache",
October 30, 1944.
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1944 when he travelled home once again to his native land to
become the opposition's candidate for the presidency.
Arevalo's profession, background, and reputation
combined to make him the ideal person to bind together the
disparate elements of the revolutionary coalition. The
students respected him because he was an educator, and the
faculty knew of him through his pedagogical writings. His
rural, middle class background gave him an understanding of
the problems of both urban and rural communities. The fact
that he had no ties to either the old landed oligarchy or
the military also worked in his favor. Guatemalan politics
had always been dominated by these two groups, and the
revolutionaries sought a complete outsider to the political
system, where even many opposition figures had been
compromised. Because of these factors and because of his
credentials as a fervent advocate of democracy, Arevalo
became the standard bearer of the opposition by mid-summer
of 1944, with the RN and FPL cooperating extensively to
support his candidacy. This informal coalition later became
the Frente Unidos de Partidos Politicos Arevalista (The
United Front of Arevalist Political Parties or FUPPA)
.
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The organization of labor unions paralleled the
formation of political parties during Ponce's reign.
71 DOS 814.00/1-845, Long to Hull, January 8th, 1945
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Although only two unions actually formed with legal
recognition, numerous guilds, mutual aid societies and
worker's groups coalesced in the summer of 1944. The railway
workers formed the first union in the weeks following
Ubico's fall. m early July, they voted to change their
mutual aid society into a full-fledged union, the Sindicato
de Accion y Mejoramiento FP.rrocarriel em (known as SAMF) .
SAMF became one of the strongest unions in Guatemala and,
within a year, had roughly 5,000 members. 72 The union
proved to be a vital force in the nascent Guatemalan labor
movement
.
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Another important step for Guatemala's union movement
came when the teachers also began organizing. In July,
1944, educators laid the foundation for the Sindicato de
Trabai
a
dores en Educacion de Guatemala (known as STEG)
.
Although the union did not officially form until January
1945, the teachers recruited members and advocated their
interests throughout this period.
In the nine months after SAMF and the teacher's group
organized no less than 15 other unions formed. Carpenters,
masons, tailors, construction workers, and cobblers all set
72DOS 814.504/5-145, Long to State, January 1st, 1945
^Edwin Bishop, "The Guatemalan Labor Movement, 1944-1959"
(Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1959), 9.
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up unions between July 1944 and May 1945. These groups
represented more than 43,000 workers. 74 Not one union had
existed prior to the fall of Ubico. The unions became an
effective political force and joined the opposition to
Ponce's plans to remain in power. Through the unions, many
groups of workers gained a political voice.
The unions and the two major political parties
coalesced into a strong unified movement in this period.
The need to clearly articulate a political vision forced the
opposition to begin formulating a platform. The workers
began discussing labor rights; teachers called for an all
out effort to eradicate illiteracy; lawyers called for
political reforms, and together they called for a
restructuring of the old order. The vague outlines of the
populist reforms which would be carried out in the following
years emerged in this period. The input of diverse social
sectors combined into a disparate and sometimes jumbled
vision of the future, but in the months that followed the
revolutionaries would slowly define their platform, thereby
defining the nature and extent of reform.
DOS 814.504/5145, Long to State, May 1, 1945
56
c « Arevalo's Return
(September - October 1944)
Arevalo's return from exile in Argentina on September
3, 1944 changed the atmosphere dramatically. The opposition
now had a leader to rally behind. in this period, the
former educator bound the diverse elements of the
revolutionary coalition together with his increasingly
charismatic leadership. Without the emergence of a
personal istic leader with charisma, Guatemala's Revolution
could not have become a populist movement in the fullest I
sense of the word. After his return, Arevalo was able to
carry his message to the people. And he went from being a
writer to being a political leader. Arevalo's ideology
became the ideology of the opposition as a whole. Peru had
Aprismo, Argentina had Peronismo
. and now Guatemala had its
own populist doctrine, Arevalismo .
On his arrival at Guatemala City's Aurora airport,
Arevalo received an ecstatic welcome from thousands of
supporters. 75 A mass of wellwishers flooded into the
streets of the city to see the motorcade pass in the largest
demonstrations since the overthrow of Ubico. It took his
car hours to reach the city center where an huge rally
El Imparcial , September 4th, 1944.
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greeted him. The message was clear: Arevalo would be a
formidable political opponent. 76
The idealistic former teacher had become a symbol of
democratic change, but he faced the arduous task of leading
the opposition to electoral victory. He was in the unusual
position of heading a group he did not know, in a country he
had not lived in for a decade. His greatest challenge was
to translate his popularity as an anonymous exile into
coherent political support for his campaign.
Arevalo struggled in the early months to define his
ideas which he called "spiritual socialism. 1,77 In
explaining this vague set of principles, he stressed more
than anything the things they were not. He rejected
materialist, socialism and capitalism, seeking a "third way,"
a unique solution to Guatemala's problems. Arevalo
attempted to formulate an alternative path to development,
just as every other Latin American populist leader had done.
One of the best sources on Arevalo and the events of this
period can be found in his autobiographical work El Candidato
Blanco v el Huracan (Guatemala, 1984)
.
^Arevalo' s writings are extensive. For his early works see
his Escritos politicos (Guatemala, 1945) which he wrote in exile
in the early 1940s. Later essays from the period 1944-1947 are
collected in his Discursos en la presidencia (Guatemala, 1948)
.
One of the most interesting selection of his writings are in his
autobiographical memoir on this period, El candidato bianco v el
huracan. 1944-1945 (Guatemala, 1984).
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in explaining "spiritual socialism," Arevalo stressed
dignity, social good, and equality of opportunity. In his
earliest writings from exile he declared -
We are socialists because we live in the twentiethcentury But we are not materialist socialists. Wedo not believe that man is primarily a stomach. Webelieve that man is above all a will for
socialism does not, therefore, aim
at an ingenious distribution of material goods, ofthe stupid economic equalization of men who are
socialism aims atliberating men psychologically, guaranteeing to
all the psychological and spiritual integritydenied by conservatism and liberalism. 78
His ideas did not change appreciably in the intervening
years between exile and his return home. 79 In February of
194 5 during a speech he emphasized dignity again. He stated:
A few days ago, the railway workers' organization
proclaimed a general strike which threatened to be
a serious social and political problem; but these
boys were not asking for higher salaries; but on
the contrary, they were putting their economic
position in danger in their effort to effect the
expulsion from the company of a chief who took
pleasure in crushing the dignity of Guatemalan
workers. They were fighting therefore for
Quoted in Schneider, Communism in Guatemala , 17.
^An interesting series of U.S. documents explain Arevalo 's
ideas as Americans tried to understand what his popularity would
mean for U.S. Guatemalan relations. See DOS 814.00/7-1444, Long
to Hull, July 14, 1944, DOS 814.00/8-2144, Long to Hull, August
21, 1944, DOS 814.00/8-2544, Long to Hull, August 21, 1944, and
DOS 814.00/9-1444, Long to Hull, September 1, 1944.
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niT^l^™* ?ignitY is80a spiritual quality andot a material quality.
With such declarations Arevalo gained more and more support
from workers and peasants unaccustomed to hearing a
presidential candidate discuss their concerns. He spoke of
changing the system of land tenure, providing health care to
the poor and enforcing labor laws to protect them. Although
only a small number of universifcari n« and lawyers knew of
him in July, by early October Arevalo had extended his
support into new social sectors. By mid-October, he had
garnered far more support than any other candidate. 81
Arevalo showed that he could translate a vague body of
political ideals into concrete support for his candidacy in
these months. What had been a broad movement without any
single leader now had an individual to draw them together.
This task was simplified by the fact that Arevalo 's
political ideals were somewhat amorphous. In essence, by
remaining vague about the specifics of reform, he became all
things to all people, personifying the aspirations of all
sectors of the coalition. In this respect, Arevalo typified
Latin American populist leaders, and the instant support he
80DOS 814.011/2-1645, Long to Hull, February 16th, 1945
81Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of
1944,", 535.
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im
received from the populace on his return transformed h
into the leader which the movement so desperately needed.
The interesting fact here is that Arevalo became the
leader of a movement which had already coalesced. The
opposition, in essence, created Arevalo as a charismatic
leader. Although he proved an articulate and able leader,
he could never have pulled the revolutionary coalition
together simply on the basis of his guile and personal
appeal. He became the spokesman for the movement and then
began to exert more and more influence as time went on.
In some ways, Arevalo is a classic case of a man created by
circumstance who rose to the challenge. Luckily for the
revolutionaries, he proved a very canny politician, because
in the months after his return it took strong leadership to
keep them unified as Ponce increased the pressure on them in
the months to come.
Tensions mounted between the Arevalistas and the
government as it became clearer and clearer that the general
intended to run for president himself. Ponce even
approached the Assembly to see if it would give him the
necessary constitutional amendment to make his election
legal. Ponce raised the stakes in late August and early
September when he began to harass the opposition parties and
labor unions. Hundreds of Indians were brought in from the
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rural areas for independence day celebrations on September
15th. 82 The peasants, armed with clubs and machetes marched
through the capital on the appointed day with pictures of
Ponce pinned to their shirts. The night before, the police
had used them to disperse an opposition meeting. 83 The
inhabitants of the city understood that if they resisted
Ponce's plans to become president, he would make them pay
dearly. The repression paralyzed the opposition. 84
On October 1st, Ponce's thugs shot Alejandro Cordova,
the editor of El Imparcial
r Guatemala's largest daily
newspaper. 85 Cordova had been an outspoken critic of the
government since the last days of Ubico. He had joined the
opposition as middle and even upper class disenchantment
with Ubico grew, and by October he had become one of the
most effective opponents of Ponce's attempts to remain in
power. Cordova's death signalled that the regime would stop
at nothing to remain in power.
El Imparcial
. September 15th - 17th, 1944. See also
Kenneth Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of
1944", 538.
83Diario de Guatemala , September 16th, 1944.
Q/
Greib, "The Guatemalan Military in the Revolution of
1944", 538. See also DOS 814.00/9-2244, Long to State, September
22, 1944.
85Diario de Centro America , October 3rd, 1944. El Imparcial .
October 3-6, 1944.
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Ponce increased the pressure further in an effort to
force the opposition to accept his presidential ambitions.
He formed a new secret police to deal with the opposition
and began to arrest student leaders. 86 The new dictator
also closed down a number of newspapers and radio stations
and forced others to "voluntarily" suspend operations. 87 He
went so far as to buy up all of the newsprint paper stocks
so that the opposition could not clandestinely publish
88papers. it became more and more difficult for Arevalo's
supporters to hold meetings as the government hounded them.
While he repressed the opposition, Ponce worked to
convince the Legislative Assembly to approve his candidacy
in spite of constitutional prohibitions. Ponce's secretary
tried to convince the members to vote for the necessary
amendment. He summoned them in groups of four and told them
that if they did not approve the changes, things could get
complicated for them. 89 Ponce's men employed similar
tactics throughout the country, pressuring local
°°DOS 814.00/9-1944, Affield to State, September 19, 1944.
87Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of
1944", 538.
MIbid.
89DOS 814.00/10-1344, Long to State, October 13, 1944.
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functionaries and prominent families to sign a declaration
in favor of Ponce's candidacy. 90
In this tense atmosphere, elections were held on
October 13-15 for Congressional seats left vacant by
oligarchs unwilling to face the fury of the populace.
William Affield, the U.S. Charge d'affaires, wrote
sarcastically that Ponce's slate '-won by a handsome, not to
say fantastic margin garnering 48,530 votes out of a total
of 44,571. » 91 The blatant fraud galvanized the opposition,
so that the only question became how and when to rid the
country of Ponce.
Three days after the polling ended, rumblings of revolt
began. The garrisons in Esquintla and Quetzaltenango
mutinied. Led by junior officers, the garrisons decided to
challenge Ponce openly. These young officers provided a key
element in the challenge to Ponce's plans to remain in
power. 92 They had carefully organized themselves, and by
October they were ready to act. Their discontent centered
on several issues related to their status and the state of
the military under the Ubiguista system, which Ponce had
90Ibid.
91Greib, Guatemalan Caudillo , 277.
92The best source on this aspect of the Revolution is
Kenneth Greib's Article, "The Guatemalan Military and the
Revolution of 1944."
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kept intact. Perhaps the most important issue was
" servilismo ," or the lack of professionalism within the
military. The young officers objected to the fact that
their institution had been reduced to simply another arena
for Ubico and Ponce to reward those who followed orders
blindly. The young officers listed their reasons for
rebellion in an article in the army's magazine, Revista
Militar. They pointed to:
- The appointment of incompetent and ineffective
generals
,
- Ubico 's fear of the young officers,
- The appointment of an illiterate general to the
position of Secretary of War because of his
usefulness to Ubico,
- Use of troops by high officials to work on
private projects
- Ponce's rule violated the constitution and the
will of the people. 3
The professionalism of American officers stationed in
Guatemala also inspired them. The contrast between
themselves and the junior officers in the American forces
made them feel the indignity of Ubico 's and Ponce's policies
all the more intensely. The officers who plotted against
Ponce felt that the affronts committed against the
institution of the army had to be addressed, and that they
had a duty to defend the constitutional order.
93
"Por que actuo el ejercito", Revista Militar , 1:2
(Jan. /Feb. 1945)
.
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The young officers had been working surreptitiously
with the civilians for months, and in October they prepared
to act. During the summer, civilians had made contact with
disgruntled officers within the army. The leadership of the
military faction came from Captain Jacobo Arbenz Guzman,
former director of the Escuela Politecnica . and, Major
Francisco Javier Arana, commander of elite Guardia de Hnnor.
Arana joined the conspiracy just three weeks before the
revolt. 94 Jorge Toriello, a well respected businessman from
Guatemala City, served as liaison between the young officers
and the opposition. These three men provided the leadership
of the revolt which finally ousted Ponce.
On the pretense of visiting his wife's family, Arbenz
travelled to El Salvador and met with Toriello who was in
San Salvador "on business." At this meeting Arbenz and
Toriello finalized plans for an armed revolt. Arana
remained in Guatemala to avoid arousing suspicion and worked
to recruit other officers. His support was the crucial
factor in the success of the revolt because of his positions
as the head of the elite Honor Guard and as a tank
95 • •commander. The Honor Guard's support proved decisive
since Ponce thought of Arana and the Guard as a bulwark
94Silvert, Guatemala: A Study in Government , 8.
95Ibid., 8.
against any rebellion and had entrusted them with all of the
Government's tanks and most of the heavy armaments. When
Arana joined the movement, he brought the firepower
necessary to bring Ponce to his knees.
While Arbenz may have been a junior partner in respect
to armaments, his role as chief officer at the Escuela
Politecnica
,
Guatemala's West Point, had gained him the
respect of the best trained and most progressive army
officers. Arbenz translated this respect into support from
junior officers around the country. 96 This support proved
decisive during the revolt as these officers imprisoned
their commanders and assured that the regime would get no
support from outlying garrisons.
The conspirators made the final decision to revolt on
October 15th, with most of the civilian leaders of the
opposition in hiding due to Ponce's crackdown. In the
presence of only a few officers, Arana and Arbenz planned a
swift stroke. Shortly after 1:00 A.M. on October 20, the
Honor Guard, led by Arana, began firing on the other forts
in the city. The rebels had distributed arms to students
and workers willing to fight to augment the number of rebel
troops. With control of the country's twelve tanks and the
Greib, "The Guatemalan Military and the Revolution of
1944
,
" 541.
support of these armed students and workers, the rebels
rapidly subdued the two loyal garrisons in heavy fighting.
A barrage of artillery fire from the Honor Guard >s barracks
fired at the main government fortification struck the
ammunition magazine and brought the fighting there to a
mercifully swift end. 97
By 4:00 a.m that morning, Ponce agreed to meet with the
rebels, but the fighting continued. The diplomatic corps
soon became involved in brokering a settlement, and by noon
the fighting stopped. 98 Ponce and his lackeys agreed to
leave the country as long as their families and property
were respected. In a single stroke the rebels had brought
down the last vestiges of Liberal rule and had finally
forced Ubico to leave the country. By October 22, they had
restored order throughout the country and immediately
organized the Revolutionary Junta, made up of Arana, Arbenz
and Toriello as a transitional government until Arevalo
could take office.
In the months following Arevalo' s return from exile
conditions in Guatemala changed decisively. The civilians
in the Arevalista parties had forged an alliance with young
y
'lbid., 541.
98DOS 814.00/10-2344, Affeild to Hull, November 7, 1944 and
DOS 814.00/10-2044, John D. Erwin(U.S. Ambassador to Honduras) to
Hull, October 20, 1944.
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military officers who pledged to help them gain power. Now,
the coalition had expanded to included discontented factions
of the military. Just as the support of the military
ensured the success of populist challenges to the old order
in Argentina, Chile, Brazil and Mexico, the recruitment of
Guatemala's young officers helped the movement achieve its
goal of ousting Ponce.
Arevalo also helped the movement realize that goal. His
appeal broadened the opposition and cemented together the
various factions at a crucial time. He offered the movement
against Ubico and Ponce the charismatic leader it needed and
in the process transformed it into a movement in support of
Arevalismo. This shift proved a decisive turning point in
the development of populism in Guatemala as personalism and
charismatic leadership, key elements of populism, emerged
definitively. From this point forward a broad movement with
effective charismatic leadership would remain a central fact
of Guatemalan political life.
D. Consolidation of the Revolution
(November 1944 - January 1945)
The overthrow of Ponce put an end to the old generals'
dreams of Ubiouismo without Ubico. In the words of
political scientist Kalman Silvert, the revolt signified "a
thunder clap break with the past." During the subsequent
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months the Revolutionary Junta outlined key aspects of a new
constitutional order. Arbenz, Arana, and Toriello set the
ground rules for change with a flurry of decrees that they
began issuing less than a week after they took power.
As the first government of the Revolution, the Junta
set in motion the machinery of reform. They achieved a sort
of Revolution by decree between October of 1944 and March of
1945. Although the constitution embodied the ideals of the
Revolution, the Junta set the tone for all the reforms that
followed. Their decrees sent a clear signal that there
would be thorough reforms to restructure the nation's
political life, but that economic reform would come later,
perhaps much later. They tackled many problems during this
period and did everything from confiscate Ubico's property
to outline who could vote. Between the October Revolution
and late November, most of the Junta's decrees addressed the
scheduling of elections and the punishments that should be
meted out to Ubico and his associates. Their first decree
dissolved Ubico's Assembly and called for new elections.
Next they carefully removed Ubico's associates from high
ranking positions and "intervened" his property."
In this early period the Junta sought to assuage the
concerns of the indigenous population with a series of
DOS 814.00/1-444, Long to Hull, January 4, 1944,
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decrees. Ponce had told the Indians that the revolution-
aries would take their land and rape their women, so the
Junta decided to move quickly to demonstrate their good
will. 100 on October 31, they abolished the notorious forced
labor drafts for road construction, disbanded the infamous
vagrancy courts, and restricted the power of finca owners.
With these decrees the Junta changed the legal relationship
between the Native Americans and the rest of society.
Concretely this meant that for the first time in their
memory, the Native Americans would not have to neglect their
crops to build roads as they had for so many years. 101
The Junta also granted the university community the
autonomy they had sought for so long. In Decree 12 issued
on November 12, 1944, the University of San Carlos received
the independence from government interference that students
had agitated for since 1920. The Junta also guaranteed the
University 100,000 guetzales and the proceeds from a new
alcohol tax for operating expenses.
On November 28, 1944, the Junta issued Decree 17, its
single most important decree, which declared the fundamental
principles of the Revolution. This decree defined the
DOS 814.2-1444, Long to State, February 16, 1945.
DOS 814.00/1-4444, Long to Hull, January 4, 1944.
parameters of law and governance for years to come. The
decree stated in the preamble that the Junta guaranteed
no?^
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of social 'w^?T1C ' ^ reli <?ious l^erty and a statewell-being consistent with the demands of thetimes and the postulates of the revolution.™1
The decree went on to outline the ten principles of the
revolution
I. Decentralization of powers of the executive and
effective separation of powers of the State.
II. Abolition of the designates to the Presidency
and substitution of them by a Vice President.
III. Alternation in the Executive Power,
abolishing reelection and recognizing the right of
the people to rebel when reelection is attempted.
IV. New constitution and organization of the army
• • •
V. Democratic organization of the municipalities
by means of popular election of their members.
VI. Effective autonomy of the Judiciary.
VII. Autonomy for the National University.
VIII. Constitutional recognition of political
parties organized in conformity with the law, and
representation of minorities in the popular
electoral colleges
.
IX. Obligatory suffrage and secret vote for the
literate man. Obligatory suffrage and public vote
for the illiterate man, limiting its exercise to
municipal elections. Recognition of the
DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November 30, 1944
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citizenship of the women prepared to exercise it.
X. Effective administrative probity. 103
The striking feature of this decree is it breadth and scope.
It establishes by fiat a number of key provisions normally
dictated by the constitution of a nation. in a single
decree, the Junta swept away a whole body of law and
precedent.
Arbenz, Toriello, and Arana also initiated a series of
minor reforms which indicated the direction they intended to
take the Revolution. They increased government pensions in
an attempt to curb corruption and garner support from the
bureaucracy. They also vowed to wipe out illiteracy and
increased taxation of the wealthy. The Junta set the limits
of reform and defined the questions on the Constituent
Assembly's schedule. Despite undemocratic methods, they
gained widespread respect for revamping the political
structure and setting the agenda for reform. In November,
1944 the U.S. Ambassador, Boaz Long, commented in an
assessment of the Junta's achievements, that
the attitude now displayed by the Revolutionary
Government tends to convince even the most cynical
that its present motives are as public-spirited as
any manifestation that has appeared in Guatemalan
103Translated in DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November
30, 1944.
73
Tm°ry ' Up to the Present, the
a d^o10\° f , 0Ct0ber 20 Seems to be ^out as pureJf?cratic ' revolution as Thomas Jefferson
HW,£aV? ima<^ned in theory - overthrowing adictator' and taking strides towards aprogressive Constitution. 104
As the Junta enacted their reforms, the student faction
of the Arevalista coalition pressured them to call elections
for a new Legislative Assembly. in the light of the
position as the leadership of the civilian opposition, the
universitarios expected to win most of the seats in the new
Congress if they capitalized on their popularity. They also
distrusted the military members of the junta. The
universitarios wanted control of the National Assembly to
check any machinations on the part of the military. 105
The difficulties over the calling of the new
Legislative Assembly in November typified the jockeying
between the civilian opposition and the Junta. The election
of the Assembly was supposed to lead to the appointment of
an interim president to discharge all executive functions
until a new president could be elected. To extract
concessions from the civilians, Arana and Arbenz refused to
issue an official decree calling the Assembly into order.
DOS 814.00/11-3044, Long to State, November 30, 1944.
Silvert, Guatemala , 9.
ow
in negotiations that followed the civilians offered to all
the Junta ruling authority until the inauguration of the new
president. They also offered Arana the position of Minister
of War, effectively giving him control over the military,
regardless of who took power. On November 28, after much
maneuvering, the Junta called the Legislative Assembly into
session with Decree 17. The decree also laid out the
principles of the Revolution and set the guidelines for the
transition to civilian rule. 106
In the negotiations over the calling of the Assembly,
the civilians gave the Army a new, more favorable statute
that redefined the relationship between the military and the
Government. They granted the Army substantial autonomy from
the office of the president. This reorganization was a
direct consequence of concerns over servilismo and
professionalism which had motivated the officers to revolt
in the first place. Arana and Arbenz wanted to create a
professional army which was free to develop without the
interference of civilians. The reorganization decree read;
... A new constitution and organization of the
Army which shall effectively guarantee its
apolitical position and permit it to discharge the
functions for which it was organized, that of
defending liberty, the Constitution, and the
national integrity, and creating within the new
organization effective guarantees for its members,
106Ibid., 9.
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The tension between the Junta and the civilians dissipated,
and both turned their attention to more pressing matters.
Within two weeks the Junta called presidential elections for
December 17-19, and one week later the Assembly set the
Constituent Assembly elections for December 28-30.
Arevalo won handily as the candidate of the United
Front of Arevalist Political Parties ( Frente Unidos a*
Partidos Politicos Areval i sta
,
or FUPPA)
. Garnering 85% of
the votes, he won the freest election in the nation 1 s
tortured political history. His defeat of parties led by
Adrian Recinos (Ubico's Ambassador to the U.S.) and Gregorio
Diaz (Ubico's Ambassador to Ecuador), signalled a definitive
break with the past. Now Arevalo had to maintain the
momentum which had brought him to power and preserve the
FUPPA' s fragile unity in the difficult transitional period
to follow.
FUPPA 's success, however, depended on the mediating
role of Arbenz, Arana and Toriello. The Junta contributed to
the revolutionary consolidation not only by their steady
stream of reforms but, more importantly, by guaranteeing
107Ibid., 10.
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free elections. By doing this they provided a solid
foundation for the establishment of a stable government
capable of carrying out the reforms the nation so
desperately needed.
With the FUPPA's electoral victory in late 1944 and
early 1945, Guatemala's populist revolutionaries had
consolidated and legitimized their claim to national
leadership. After Ponce's fall the Arevalista parties
mobilized massive popular support into a strong mandate tor
change. Never had a single party legally obtained such a
resounding victory. Never again would Guatemalan society be
in such agreement. This period marked the zenith of the
revolutionary coalition' unity. They had repudiated the
past, now they faced the divisive task of constructing the
future.
E. The Constitution
(January - M.irdi I'M'.)
When the process of drafting the Constitution began in
early January, 1945 the initiative shiftad Crom the three
man Junta to the Constituent Assembly. The now constitution
codified the spirit of the Junta':; relorms and became the
revolutionaries' blueprint for a new Guatemala. The ideals
expressed in the new Constitution reveal the populist nature
7 7
of the Revolution and the transforming vision of the
coalition which ruled the country for the next decade.
Also the drafting of the constitution revealed the
tensions within the revolutionary coalition and the limits
to reform. The members of the drafting bodies revealed
biases and prejudices which had remained latent until this
point. The most obvious of these revealed themselves in the
discussions about who could become a citizen, and by
extension who deserved a voice in the nation's political
life. By focussing on the debates about suffrage and
citizenship I will reveal some the biases which limited the
extent of political reform.
Although the legislators addressed a wide range of
issues, the single most important debate focused on how
Guatemala's political system should be democratized.
This debate became the center of attention because many of
the revolutionaries realized that no socio-economic change
could occur without a complete revamping of the political
system. Therefore, the revolutionaries put political reform
at the top of their agenda. The inclusion of new groups of
voters proved to be the key issue defining this debate. The
polemics on the expansion of political participation
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illustrates two important points. 108 First, the Legislative
Assembly expanded political participation just as other
populist regimes had throughout Latin America. Secondly,
they did so cautiously with the goal of consolidating their
political project.
The 140 men elected to the Legislative Assembly
represented all factions of the coalition that had brought
down Ubico. They ranged from conservative businessmen to
radical unionists, but they shared some basic attributes.
As a general rule, they were young (with an average age of
35) ; the vast majority had direct or indirect ties to the
University, and many deputies represented the FPL and RN
political parties.
On December 28 - 30, 1944 the nation went to the polls
again and selected the members of the new Constituent
Assembly. The 57 men elected had one task, to craft a new
constitution. In keeping with Guatemalan parliamentary
tradition, the Constituent Assembly then elected fifteen of
its members, called La Comision de los Quince (The
Commission of Fifteen) , to draft the new organic law. This
group, more than any other, defined the nuts and bolts of
Guatemala's post-Ubico political order. The Junta had set
108The debates have been compiled in Diario de sesiones de la
asemblea constituente de 1945 (Guatemala , 1951)
.
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the tone of reform, but the Commission defined the
principles and legal mechanisms which carried it to
fruition. They produced a draft which formed the basis for
all subsequent discussions of the constitution and set the
parameters for debate.
The composition of the Commission reflected the
structure of the larger Legislative Assembly, and by
extension the revolutionary coalition. The president of the
Assembly, Jorge Garcia Granados, chaired the Commission.
Six liberals, six centrists, and two Social Democrats formed
the rest of the committee. 109 Lawyers and law students, held
fourteen of the fifteen seats, giving the Law Faculty at the
University disproportional representation. 110
The Comision drew on two main sources for inspiration
as it worked to formulate an initial draft. Guatemala's
previous constitutions comprised the most important
influence on the commission's draft. Many aspects of the
1879 Constitution remained intact in the 1945 document.
The new constitution had a structure very similar to its
The fifteen members of the Commission were: Jorge Garcia
Granados, Francisco Villagran, Adolfo Almengor, Bernardo Alvarado
Tello, Clemente Marroquin Rojas, David Vela, Jorge Adan Serrano,
Jose Falla Aris, Jose Luis Bocaletti, Julio Antonio Reyes
Cardona, Julio Bianchi, L. Alberto Paz y Paz, Manuel de Leon
Cardona, Carlo Garcia Bauer, and Jose Rolz Bennett.
110Silvert, Guatemala , 15.
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predecessors and the language echoed terms employed in the
nineteenth century. An influential document called the
^^^^ drafted by students and
faculty in the Law School served as the second important
influence on the commission's work. Many initial
discussions of the group focused exclusively on the
suggestions included in this document. 111 in fact, the
Anteproyecto contained suffrage restrictions very similar to
those eventually adopted by the Assembly. Three key members
of the Comision participated in the formulation of the
Anteproyecto
,
and they proved forceful advocates for the
suggestions included in it.
The overall tenor of the constitution, however, was
new. The drafting committee included guarantees which had
never before been made to the Guatemalan people. Article 1
captures the new tone by stating;
Guatemala is a free, sovereign and independent
republic, organized toward the primary end of
assuring its inhabitants the enjoyment of liberty,
culture, economic welfare and social justice . Its
system of government is democratic-representative"
(emphasis added). 112
111The entire Anteproyecto can be seen in published form in
Anteproyecto a la Constitucion de Guatemala
,
(Guatemala, 1947).
112Silvert, Guatemala , 218.
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Ensuring social justice and economic welfare became the
State's responsibility for the first time in the nation's
history. with the constitutional reforms the members of the
Constituent Assembly forged a new conception of the state
and its responsibilities to the citizenry.
The Assembly also broke ground in guaranteeing new
rights for workers. They outlined the basic elements of
what would become Guatemala's first labor code in 1947. in
a series of nineteen new articles the Assembly set a minimum
wage, outlawed payment in kind, granted the right to free
organization, mandated paid vacation, regulated female and
child labor, and set an eight hour day. Article 66 even
recognized unions and cooperatives as the basis for "social
compatibility." This provision reflected the corporatist
tendency of Latin American populism, where governments used
unions and similar organizations to mobilize and control the
people. 113
Moving beyond simply guaranteeing worker's rights,
Article 2 established the right to rebel if the government
violated the constitutional order. This provision developed
from the Revolutionary Junta's decree that the people could
113For an interesting discussion of this phenomenon in Brazil
see Kenneth Paul Erikson's article, "Brazil Corporative
Authoritarianism, Democratization, and Dependency" in Howard J.
Wiarda and Harvey F. Kline, Latin American Politics and
Development (Boulder, 1979)
.
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resist if the Executive attempted to remain in power beyond
the single term allowed by law.
The constitution also introduced precedent-setting
ideas for the nation about private property. While
recognizing the right to individual property, the document
declared that all property had a social function (Article
90)
.
The law went further to say that the State could
expropriate land with prior compensation if the owner did
not fully utilize it (Article 92).
In another break with tradition, the constitutional
framers outlawed latifundia. striking at the heart of the
oligarchic system they so despised. The law stated that
existing large landholding could only be extended once "they
may be organized for the benefit of society." 114 This vague
provision demonstrates that the revolutionaries wanted a
legal basis to attack the nation's archaic agricultural
system.
The new constitution went further to outline the
State's duty to demonstrate a preference for the laboring
masses in Article 88, which reads
The State shall orient the national economy for
the benefit of the people, toward the end of
assuring each individual an existence which is
dignified and of benefit to society. It is the
primary function of the State to develop
114Silvert, Guatemala , 219.
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towaS ^faI SC^Vities and industry in general,ward the end that the fruits of labor shall
?E£ ftntlalJy banofit those who produce them and
?nh^^S Tal^h Sha11 reach f£e greatest number ofi habitants of the Republic. 115
State intervention to ensure social justice formed the basis
of the new economic ideology which the revolutionaries
sought to impose on the nation. The committee's ideas
mirrored the efforts of Vargas, Peron, and Cardenas.
The assembly also nationalized all sub-soil rights,
effectively nationalizing oil exploration and exploitation
(Article 89). This law explicitly echoed the Mexican
Constitution of 1917 which the populist President Lazaro
Cardenas employed in 1938 to nationalize American and
British oil companies.
The constitution did not only address economic issues,
however. Many provision dealt with social and cultural
issues. In fact, Article 79 established the "development and
dissemination of culture, in all its manifestations" as a
primary obligation of the State. The entire seventh section
of the constitution addressed cultural issues. Again, this
provision reflected the efforts of other populist regimes.
Much as Mexico encouraged "national" art, and the APRA
movement of Peru drew on Indian "nationalism," Guatemala's
115Ibid.
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revolutionaries sought to define their national culture in a
positive way.
Although cultural and economic issues often preoccupied
the revolutionaries, the transformation of the political
system remained the most important project of the
Constituent Assembly. without changes in the political
system, they had no way of safeguarding the socio-economic
system they hoped to create. The desire to protect the
advances embodied in the rest of the constitution focused
the Assembly's energy on the creation of a new political
order based on expanded political participation.
Article 9, which outlined citizenship and voting
rights, formed the centerpiece of the Constituent Assembly's
political reforms. While the members took great care to
outline the responsibilities of the Executive, Legislative
and Judicial branches, they realized that electoral power
would determine their ability to deliver the promised
reforms. That realization created tensions within the
Assembly over the speed and extent of democratic
liberalization. Thus expansion of suffrage became the locus
of controversy throughout most of the spring of 194 5.
The real debate revolved around the granting of
suffrage to illiterates and women, the two groups explicitly
excluded by previous constitutions. The potentially
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unpredictable nature of these groups- political allegiances
made many of the revolutionaries wary of granting them
political power through the vote. The final, somewhat
convoluted, wording which the Commission settled on
reflected their uneasiness about introducing democracy too
quickly. Article 9, states:
Citizens are:
1. Males over eighteen years of age;
2. Guatemalan women over eighteen years of aqewho know how to read and write; Rights and dutiesinherent in citizenship are; to elect, be elected,
and take public office. Suffrage is obligatory and
secret for those able to read and write; optional
and secret for female citizens, optional andpublic for illiterate citizens. All males of
eighteen years who know how to read and write are
obliged to register with the Civic Registry
within the year they obtain citizenship. For
women and illiterates, such registration is a
right. Illiterates may exercise suffrage six
months after having registered. ...No one may
force a female citizen or an illiterate to
register in the Civic Registry or to vote. Nor
may any citizen be compelled to vote for a given
person.
The reason the Assembly chose this definition is clear. The
total exclusion of illiterate women and restricted suffrage
for illiterate men and literate women created an electoral
bloc large enough to provide them with victory at the ballot
box. Without losing control of the political system, they
116Ibid., 208
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ensured themselves electoral success. This somewhat
bizarre, multi-level voting system grew directly out of the
revolutionaries' attempt to bring about a transformation
from above. They had made tenuous progress which only
cautious political maneuvering could safeguard.
There did not exist any kind of populist model either
that they could look to in trying to solve the problem of
expanding the electorate. Argentina, Mexico, Brazil, all
had granted differing amounts of political participation to
illiterates and women. The disagreement among populist
nations over the right of citizenship demonstrates the
difficulties inherent in such a project.
The extent of the revolutionaries' caution is
illustrated by the fact that not even a single member of the
committee advocated universal suffrage. All of the members
favored some sort of restrictions on illiterates' and
women's votes. They shared a fear that somehow "unprepared"
groups could undermine the new political order. On January
24, 1945 the Commission began its deliberations on the
extension of suffrage to women. Speaking in the first
minutes of debate, Alberto Paz y Paz, the representative
from Zacapa, expressed the general sentiment in favor of
restriction. He said
I think that women should not be excluded from
political rights . . . and I believe that the
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The members of the Commission argued endlessly over the
capacity of women to participate in the political system.
After much debate, however, the fifteen members agreed to
table discussion of women's role until they had decided the
fate of illiterates which they thought might be easier to
resolve.
The discussion of whether to extend the vote to those
who could not read or write dragged on for several sessions.
The fear that the "illiterate masses" would be used by some
demagogue to revive Liberal tyranny remained the touchstone
of debate. However, precisely this fear of demagoguery
provided the impetus for granting illiterates the vote.
Clemente Marroguin Rojas, a long time opposition figure from
El Progreso in the Oriente region, gave the most succinct
explanation of the Commission's thinking. He stated that if
illiterates were not granted the vote, "the Liberal Party
will triple its size inside of two months and with perfect
right." Alberto Paz y Paz echoed this sentiment when he
rose to warn of the consequences of denying the vote to
illiterates. He said
117Comisi6n de los Quince, Diario de Sesiones de la Comision
de los Quince , (Guatemala, 1947), 83.
118Ibid., 88.
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The Commission soon realized that to deny illiterates
the vote was to negate the democratic aspirations of the
Revolution and, perhaps more importantly, to risk alienating
a very volatile political force. David Vela, the editor of
El Imparcial
,
highlighted this contradiction for the
Commission when he proposed the formation of a sub-committee
to consider the topic. He said that extension of the vote
to the majority of Guatemalans (roughly 70 percent of the
population couldn't read or write) was the key "to the
democratic organization that you are going to give to the
country. 1,120
Eventually, Jorge Garcia Granados overcame the impasse
with his deft political arguments. He pointed out that the
responsibility for the previous dictatorships did not lie
with the illiterate population. Ubico's rule
was the handiwork of the capital City, the
handiwork of General Manuel Orellena, backed up by
his cannons, by the U.S. Ambassador, and a group
119Ibid., 87.
120Ibid., 92.
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of Deputies that were the real civicilliterates. 1
Finally, on January 30, 1945, the Commission accepted
wording which extended the vote to illiterate men with the
condition that they vote publically. Literate men had the
right to vote secretly, but the legislators wanted the new
voters to cast their ballots in the open under the watchful
eyes of electoral officials.
That same day they accepted the wording which empowered
literate women to vote but disenfranchised illiterate women.
The Commission spent many days thrashing out the details of
the proposal. The fact that they granted literate women the
vote and excluded illiterate women reveals the persistence
of class antagonisms within the populist coalition
represented by the Assembly.
In the discussions of women's suffrage, the issue
quickly became not whether women should get the vote, but
which women and under what circumstances. As the debate on
citizenship for women proceeded, it became clear that the
revolutionaries were very uncomfortable with the idea of
giving the illiterate, Indian female population the vote.
The Commission thought that these women were more
susceptible to outside influences, that they would respond
121 Ibid., 91
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to the agitation of the Catholic Church and reactionary
forces. This fear was, in part, based on their knowledge of
the role women played in the 1933 elections in Spain. Rural
Spanish women, mobilized by the church, hurt the Republican
parties badly. 122 These women had only been granted the vote
in 1931, so the lessons appeared clear. Newly enfranchised
women could prove a powerful force when organized by the
church. Garcia Granados lived in Spain during the Republic
and had close ties to the Republican government. He and
other members of the Commission who had fought for the
Spanish government against fascism had powerful memories of
women mobilized by the forces of conservatism.
Similarly, many of the members of the Commission,
including such influential figures as Garcia Granados,
Villagran, and Bianchi, had been exiled to Mexico during the
previous decades where rural women participated in a number
of conservative movements led by the church. 123 The Cristero
revolt of the 1920s, which attacked the government of
Plutarco Calles, had been supported by many poor, rural
women who had close ties to the church. A more recent
W.M. Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico (Gainesville, 1962)
,
23
.
123For a discussion of attitudes towards woman suffrage in
Mexico see William Blough, "Political Attitudes of Mexican Women:
Support for the Political System Among a Newly-enfranchised
Group", Journal of Interamerican Studies . 14:2 (1972), 202-203.
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example, which many members of the Commission may have seen
first-hand, took place during the 1939 elections. in that
year, the Mexican Congress discussed extending the vote to
women. However, during the campaigning for the 1940
elections large numbers of women participated in a
conservative, church-backed challenge to the ruling Partido
Revolucionario ^nxt^+^^^^ 124 The Congress dec ided to
postpone granting Mexican women the vote as a result of this
challenge.
So this abiding fear of rural women's political role
was based on the experiences of the Commission members.
What is even more interesting is that the Commission almost
seems to be saying that "our women" (read urban, literate,
middle to upper class) can be trusted, while women we cannot
influence are a danger to the revolutionary project. This
attitude reveals the limits of the revolutionaries
democratic ideology and highlights the importance of socio-
racial and class identification within the revolutionary
coalition.
The debate about granting women the vote followed much
the same route as the debates about the political
reliability of illiterates. Discussion once more focused on
who had been to blame for the tyranny of the previous
Morton, Woman Suffrage in Mexico , 39-41.
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decades. As with the illiterate male population, the
Assembly members feared the rural masses generally because
of the perception that Ubico 's rule had depended on them.
Clemente Marroquin Rojas challenged this assumption when he
bluntly stated:
In respect to the fears of Representative Vela and
of Representative Rolz about the influence of thepriests over women, effectively there is no suchdecisive influence. You have observed that all
women had a primordial role in the last marches,
while the majority of men were in hiding. I have
never seen a woman collecting signatures for the
reelection of Ubico, but I have seen men
collecting signatures. 125
He reminded the Commission that it was men like themselves,
mostly urban and educated, who supported Ubico for so many
years, not women.
Garcia Granados made a very revealing comment toward
the end of the debate. The Commission was arguing over
whether or not the vote should be optional or obligatory for
women. Garcia Granados outlined the basis for their final
decision to make the vote optional. He stated:
Women ought to vote optionally. The majority of
women are not interested, and when obliged to vote
they will ask advice of certain people. They are
125Comision de los Quince, Diario de sesiones , 80.
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not going to vote according to their own
criteria.
Again, the revolutionaries expressed their fear that women
cannot make political decisions for themselves. Outside
influence and the haunting specter of reaction, dogged the
revolutionaries as they tried to forge a new Guatemala.
Many of the deputies felt that educational restrictions
could insulate the electoral system from outside influence.
They proposed making reading and writing the basis for
proving a woman's capacity to be a good citizen. This
requirement effectively reduced the number of women who
could vote to around 22,000. According to the 1940 census
there were approximately 3 60,000 literate women in all of
Guatemala. Of this number only 22,206 could both read and
write. 127
This statistic reveals that, with a stroke of the pen,
the drafting commission disenfranchised 340,000 women for
decades to come by simply adding the requirement that they
be able to read and write. Out of a total female population
of roughly 1.6 million, about 800,000 had already been
excluded by the provision which conditioned voting on the
126Ibid., 176.
127Asamblea Constituyente, Diario de sesiones de la Asamblea
Constituvente (Guatemala, 1947), 131.
94
ability to read, of the remaining 360,000 women who could
read, only a tiny fraction could both read and write. The
Commission deemed only a minute portion of the female
population capable of executing the complicated task of
voting (and, of course supporting them at election time). 128
In contrast to their view of rural women, the
Commission felt a responsibility to recognize the competence
of "their" women, the women of Guatemala City, who had
acted so decisively in the struggle against Ubico.
Representative Rolz Bennett made his admiration for these
urban educated women explicit when he declared, "I remember
the march of June 25th, in which women were more civic
minded in many cases than we." 129 This sentiment was echoed
by Francisco Villagran
I acknowledge the external influences that weigh
on the spirit of women. We witnessed the brilliant
actions of our wives, our daughters during the
march in the last week of June that brought as its
consequence the decision of Ubico to renounce his
power. 130
The Commission trusted middle class women, so their only
task was to decide what other women had the capacity to
128Ibid.
129Comision de los Quince, Diario de sesiones , 84
130Ibid., 85.
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exercise the sacred duty of voting. Who had shown the
necessary civic spirit?
Women had proven their civic spirit in many ways during
the preceding months through marches, organizing, forming
auxiliaries to the political parties and many other ways.
Women took part in the fighting that drove Ponce from power.
To ensure that the Assembly did not forget their role in the
Revolution, a group of middle class women formed the Pro-
Citizenship Feminine Union of Guatemala (Union Femenina
Guatemalteca Prociudadania
^ , which directly addressed the
Assembly during the debates. They sent a letter to the
Constituent Assembly that Representative Manuel Fortuny read
on February 6th, 1945. These women felt they had already
demonstrated their capacity to vote, and so they
respectfully demanded that suffrage be extended to them. The
letter reads,
The directorate of the Pro-Citizenship Feminine
Union of Guatemala that gathers in its bosom by
the thousands women of the entire Republic,
belonging to diverse social sectors and of all
political and religious creeds courteously address
you so that through your generosity may be carried
to this Constituent Assembly the voice of
Guatemalan women who reclaim for themselves the
recognition of their political rights. The
representatives know the decisive and overwhelming
attitude that Guatemalan women had in the days
before the October Revolution, and during the
revolution itself, and because of that personal
knowledge you are in a position to weigh the high
civicism that embodied women's attitude, civicism
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IxtrniZ
ut .t°. the test the capacity of women toe e c se their rights of citizenship and the
complementary obligations which it brings. ... youcan deceive yourself and perpetuate the injustice
of the Organic Law drawn up in 1935, to declare
expressly that citizenship is only a masculineprivilege.
Signed,
Garciela Quan Valenzuela (President)
Elisa Hall Asturias (Vice President)
Angelina Acuha de Castaneda (Secretary)
A similar letter, by Doha Rosa de Mora, challenged the
members to fulfill the promise of the Revolution, and
pointed out the dilemma they faced. She wrote,
Knowing your spirit of justice I hope that you
will not place conscientious women in a condition
inferior to that of the illiterate population.
May God enlighten you for the good of the
country.
Testament to the fact that middle class women could not
be excluded from the political system is captured in an
exchange between two deputies on the final day of debate
about granting women suffrage. Jose Manuel Fortuny, who
would later be important in the Guatemalan Worker's Party,
proposed the exclusion of all women from voting "to defend
the authentic principles of the revolution." He cited the
fact that even Mexico had not granted women the vote after
131Asemblea Constituyente , Diario de Sesiones , 151
132Ibid. |
30 years as a revolutionary nation. in response Carlos
Garcia Bauer, one of the original fifteen members of the
drafting committee gave a stirring speech. After Fortuny's
proposal, Garcia Bauer asked
Why have you forgotten so soon the heroic gesture
of Guatemalan women? The 2 5th of June women
brilliantly saved the Guatemalan Revolution.
Guatemalan women sustained their efforts in thedays of Ponce, they fought politically, founded
clubs, braving all manner of danger, and
Guatemalan women in the uniform of Army nurses on
October 2 0th ran among the bullets. What are you
thinking then? 133
He chronicled the contributions women had made to the life
of the nation in a long speech which was punctuated with
applause throughout. Finally, he concluded "Well then, give
them the vote." That day, February 6th, 194 5, the Assembly
included wording which granted literate women the vote.
This dramatic climax to the debates reveals that the
revolutionaries recognized the political role of middle
class women. These women's participation in the Revolution
and their position as members of the newly ascendent middle
class gained them the right to a public political role. The
politicians viewed them as allies in the consolidation of
the Revolution.
133Ibid., 164
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Another, interesting point here is that the Assembly
granted the vote to illiterate men because of their fear of
alienating the majority of the population as seen in the
debate above. But, they granted literate women the vote, as
we shall see, because they had proven their "civic spirit"
(i.e. that they were politically reliable. And Illiterate
women were excluded entirely, presumably because they had
not proven their reliability and because they were not
powerful enough to be actively feared. The complex, multi-
tiered political system which the legislator created
reflected biases, personal experiences, and political
realities, but at the same time it reflects the cautious and
pragmatic nature of the revolutionary coalition. They sought
to guarantee the success of their political project, and the
exclusion of illiterate women from the rights of citizenship
was not a large price to pay, for the revolutionaries.
The tragedy of this period is that the Constituent
Assembly even while recognizing the contribution of some
women excluded the majority of women from the public
political sphere for years to come, and in doing so they
confirmed the class and ethnic biases of the Revolution.
The rural masses had not participated in the Revolution to
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any real degree and as a result their marginalization in the
political and economic life of the nation continued. 134
The direction of change remained somewhat unclear in
the Spring of 1945, but the revolutionaries had made the
fateful decision to perpetuate a system based on ethnic and
class divisions. In doing so they decided that politics
would still be dictated from the capital without the
participation of Guatemala's majority. Politics would
remain the stuff of the urban, educated population, and in
that respect not much had changed. What had changed is that
new groups had forced their way into political power to
shape Guatemala to their needs.
In his book Populism in Peru , Steve Stein stresses that a
key element of populism is an effort to mobilize and control the
masses. It is unclear to what extent the revolutionaries
intended to construct the constitutional system as a means of
direct social control, but the end result proved to be the same.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
The inauguration of Juan Jose Arevalo on March 15th,
1945 signalled the definitive triumph of Guatemala's
populist revolutionaries. They had succeeded in their goal
of establishing a political system that could facilitate the
restructuring of the nation's socio-economic order, with
the new constitution and Arevalo as president, they now
turned their attention to economic and social reform. They
faced the challenge of translating the vague promises of
Arevalismo into practice.
When the president elect took office, however, one
thing remained clear: the direction and content of the
reforms to come had already been determined by the nation's
new law of the land. The laws which followed simply
extended and elaborated the provisions of the 194 5
constitution. The president and congress enacted laws which
established a national health care system, founded the
Guatemalan Social Security Institute, created a worker's
compensation system, funded rural education programs, and
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encouraged unionization. m short, they transformed the
nation's socio-economic system by decree. 135
What then is the legacy of the initial twelve months of
the Revolution? First and foremost, the nation now had a
blueprint for change and a group of politicians determined
to revolutionize the socio-economic system. There existed
for the first time both the political will and the legal
mechanisms for social change. This fact not only altered the
political system, it generated new attitudes. For so many of
the country's inhabitants, the realization that the nation's
corrupt, dictatorial past had truly been repudiated created
a sense of hope and optimism for the future.
Second, Guatemala's middle class had forced their way
into power. Never again would the old oligarchy rule with
such absolute control as it had prior to the overthrow of
Ubico. The military also came into its own as an
independent political actor in the uprisings of 1944. They
had become the arbiters of Guatemalan politics with an
agenda all their own, and no government could hope to remain
in power without their support.
135An excellent work which reviews the reforms of the Arevalo
administration is Leo Suslow's, Aspects of the Social Reform in
Guatemala. 1944 -1949: Problems of Planned Social Change in an
Underdeveloped Country (Hamilton, N.Y., 1949). For a more
concise summary of the basic elements of the reforms see Jim
Handy, Gift of the Devil , 106-113.
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Third, the nation's political system had been radically
altered by the expansion of suffrage to new groups. Jacobo
Arbenz's landslide victory in 1950 attests to the
revolutionaries' success in creating electoral support for
themselves. Out of an official total of 417,000 votes,
Arbenz carried 263,234, with his closest challenger winning
only 74
,
3 41. 136 Arbenz's overwhelming victory as a candidate
for reform depended heavily on the votes of illiterates
enfranchised by the 1945 constitution.
The 1950 elections marked the advent of modern mass
politics in Guatemala. From 1944 forward political parties
extended their reach further and further into the remote
highlands in an attempt to garner support. Campaigns drew
more and more people into the political life of the
nation. 137 Although the military dictatorship established
after 1954 resorted to electoral fraud and intimidation,
136Marta Cehelsky, ed. , Guatemalan Election Factbook ,
(Washington, 1966), 31.
137For an interesting commentary on the impact of the
Revolution on the political life of the rural majority see Robert
Wasserstrom, "Revolution in Guatemala: Peasant and Politics under
the Arbenz Government," Comparative Studies in Society and
History , 17:4 (October , 1975) , 443-470
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broad sectors of society now had the sense that they had a
right to a political voice. 138
Fourth, the nation had witnessed the emergence of a
dynamic movement for reform which was populist in every
sense of the word. The Revolution shared the attributes of
being "urban, multi-class, electoral, expansive, "popular-,
and led by a charismatic leader" with other populist
experiments of this period. 139 Guatemala's variant,
Arevalismo, grew out of the combination of economic
discontent, growing nationalism, and desire for political
liberalization. Just as groups in other countries sought a
"third way" to achieve social and economic development, so
too did the leaders of the uprising against Ubico.
The tragedy of Guatemala's populist movement to
modernize is that it suffered a unique demise. Unlike
Argentine Peronism, Brazil's Getulismo
. Peru's Aprismo . and
other movements which collapsed mostly due to internal
problems, Guatemala's Revolution was attacked from without.
It too suffered from internal tensions and disunity, but
For commentary on the growth of political expectations see
John W. Sloan's "Electoral Frauds and Social Change: The
Guatemalan Example," Science and Society , 34:1 (Spring, 1970),
78-91.
139Michael Conniff, "Towards a Comparative Definition of
Populism," in Michael Conniff, ed. , Latin American Populism in
Comparative Perspective , (Albuquerque, 1982), 13.
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U.S. intervention proved the decisive factor in bringing
the reforms of 1944 to an abrupt end in 1954.
In 1952, Jacobo Arbenz, the second president of the
Revolution finally attacked the nation's archaic
agricultural system with a thorough land reform. The law,
known as Decree 900, set up a massive national land reform
which redistributed unused land from the largest landholders
in an attempt to make more efficient use of the land. 140
Within two years over 900,00 acres of land had been turned
over to cooperatives and individuals. Fully 500,000
individuals out of a total population of 3 million gained
access to land as result of the reform. 141 Finally, the
rural masses began to see the concrete benefits of the
Revolution.
Arbenz' s reform shook the nation's oligarchy to its
core and began to break the centuries-old hold they had over
the economy. Arbenz also attacked the United Fruit Company,
expropriating 200,000 acres which the government immediately
140For the literature on the Agrarian Reform see Jose Luis
Paredes Moriera, Reforma aqraria: un experiencia quatemalteca
(Guatemala, 1963) ; Jesus Garcia Ahoveros, La reforma aqraria de
Arbenz en Guatemala (Madrid
. 1987) ; Mario Monteforte Toledo, "La
reforma agraria en Guatemala", Trimestre Economico . 19:3 (Jul.-
Sept. 1952), 389-407; and Jim Handy, "The Most Precious Fruit of
the Revolution: The Guatemalan Agrarian Reform, 1952-1954",
Hispanic American Historical Review 68:4 (November, 1988): 75-
705.
141Handy, Gift of the Devil , 128.
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distributed to 23,000 peasants. 1 *2 The president realized
that in order to change Guatemala from what he called "a
dependent nation with a semi-colonial economy" into an
independent nation he had to break both the elite and
UFCO. 143
The challenge to UFCO, however, proved to be fatal for
the Revolution. The U.S. government could not sit idly by
and watch as an important American company had land taken
from it. The new Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles and
his brother Allen Dulles, the director of the CIA, began to
plot the demise of Arbenz for so impetuously challenging
American economic interests. 144 The Dulles brothers had
served UFCO faithfully for years as negotiators for the
company's contracts with Jorge Ubico in 1931 and 1936. 145
Now they had a chance to serve again.
142Ibid., 142.
143Ibid., 115.
144The best account of this episode can be found in Richard
Immerman, The CIA and Guatemala: The Foreign Policy of
Intervention (Austin
,
1982) . Other works include: Arthur
Schlesinger and Steven Kinzer, Bitter Fruit, The Untold Story of
the American Coup in Guatemala (New York, 1983) ; Edelberto
Torres-Rivas "Crisis y Conyuntura critica; La caida de Arbenz y
los contratiempos de la revolucion burguesa", Revista Mexicana de
Sociolocria . XLI:1 (enero-marzo, 1979), 297-323; and Jose
Aybar de Soto, Dependency and Intervention (Boulder, CO., 1975).
145Handy, Gift of the Devil . 139.
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The CIA armed and funded a polyglot group of exiled
Guatemalan army officers and mercenaries to overthrow
Arbenz. The agency even went so far as to supply planes,
bombs and American pilots to the counterrevolution. Against
the U.S., Arbenz and the Revolution did not stand a chance.
Internal tensions assisted the Dulles brothers in their
plans. After 10 heady years of progress, the Revolution
collapsed when attacked. Weighed down by the burden of
rapidly delivering economic and social change and balancing
the interests of so many different sectors, the populist
coalition broke into fragments. Various groups which had
been bound together by nebulous common goals began
quarrelling as the reforms began to reallocate power and
resources. Many of the early supporters of the Revolution
turned to oppose it as the government began to carry the
reforms further and further.
When the CIA-backed counterrevolutionaries began
bombing Guatemala City and invaded the country, Arbenz faced
the agonizing choice of capitulating because the Army would
not support him or arming the workers and students and
risking all out civil war. He capitulated. U6
U6It is interesting to note that Arbenz confronted the same
dilemma that Peron and Vargas faced when challenged by military
opposition. All three gave up the reigns of power rather than
plunge their nations into armed civil strife.
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Colonel Castillo Armas, the Americans' hand-picked
leader of the coup, immediately began undoing the work of
the Revolution. He annulled the Constitution of 1945 and
began persecuting the political parties, unions and peasant
groups which formed the backbone of Arbenz's support.
Castillo Armas' supporters killed hundreds of peasants
accused of being "communists." 147 Almost overnight,
Guatemala regressed to the days of Ubico.
In the decades since Guatemala's "liberation" by the
U.S. backed coup the nation has experienced a frightful
epidemic of violence. Poverty continues to hold the
majority of the population in its grasp. The praetorian
military dictatorships which have held the reins of power
since 1954 identify all who challenge them as "communist."
Labor unions struggle to survive in a nation where
organizing means risking disappearance and torture. The
country which held so much promise between 1944 and 1954 now
bears the epitaph, "the land of eternal tyranny."
Arevalo's inaugural address reverberates across the
decades in haunting condemnation of contemporary Guatemalan
governments and their failure to address the needs of the
majority. Even though he spoke of the days of Ubico and
u7John Gillin and Kalman Silvert, "Ambiguities in
Guatemala", Foreign Affairs , 34 (April, 1956), 470.
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Cabrera, he could just as easily have been referring to the
military dictatorships of the 1970s and 1980s when he said:
^
ha^en the . c°nviction - and I continue to have
t; "^Jta nation cannot be free while any one of
\t 2bitants are unfree, and that the dignityof the Republic is made of synthesis of thedignity that dwells, living and protected, in each
of those that live off the earth. To attain this
we must confront the peculiar social and economic
structure of the country: of a country where the
culture, politics and economy are in the hands ofthree hundred families heirs of colonial
privileges or sell outs in foreign factories or
members of an official administrative sect which
protect those interests and expand geometrically
their own.
... There must begin in Guatemala from
various directions at once and promoted with
integrity a liberating movement for the majority
which lawfully restores the rights of citizenship
wrongfully stolen and which promotes the stammered
economic demands of the proletariat, the workers
and the peasants. In this Guatemala, ravaged by
foreigners and Guatemalans, the agents that suck
dry the nation's riches and maintain culture on an
aristocratic level must be confronted. 148
148Juan Jose Arevalo, Escritos Politicos v Discursos (Havana,
1953), 495-496.
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